🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <1992Dec18.000631.26201@psych.toronto.edu> christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green) writes:
>In article <1992Dec17.015705.630@cs.su.oz.au> danny@cs.su.oz.au (Danny) writes:
>>
>>OK.  If there are no differing causal consequences at all between your 
>>sensation of colour and mine then I would argue that your sensation of 
>>colour is the same as mine.  
>
>And what, pray tell, would be your warrant for that conclusion.
>Assuming you're limiting "causal consequences" to behavioral ones,
>you've only looked a half the story. If you don't, on the other hand,
>limit to behavioral consequences, then I'll claim (from personal
>experience) that you're just wrong.

I am not limiting "causal consequences".  You can claim that I'm wrong,
but since from your own position there's no way of telling who's right,
and since your position require extra properties, I win by application
of Occam's razor...

>>What's the point in postulating some additional 
>>property to make them different? (I still need a shave, despite my fondness 
>>for the Razor :)
>>
>The point is that it just might be true, which is far mor important 
>than Occam's rather pitted and badly worn razor.

What do you mean "it might just be true"?  You are claiming that
there is intrinsically NO WAY of telling whether it's true or not, so what 
would it mean to say it is true?

As I said before, there is an invisible and intangible pink elephant that
follows you around everywhere.  There is no way you can ever tell whether
this is the case or not, but "it might just be true"...

Danny.