Article View: sci.crypt
Article #131Re: Back to crypto (registered keys)
From: Timothy C. May
Date: Thu, 29 Oct 1992 03:13
Date: Thu, 29 Oct 1992 03:13
54 lines
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3027 bytes
Carl Ellison (cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com) wrote: : : Politics aside for a second, there's an interesting crypto problem here. I think Carl is absolutely right. Besides the obvious policy and philosophical issues, the Denning/Rivest key registration idea has many "crypto protocol" aspects. Granted, it's not number theory, but it's still part of the crypto family. Some issues: - Can encryption-within-encryption be detected? How? - If noise is sent to foil traffic analysis, how will the Denning/Rivest proposal deal with it? (The general issue that a person can always shrug and say he was sending random bits. Are there technical means of proving otherwise?) - For n-out-of-m voting protocols (to reveal the key) are used, what are reasonable values for n and m? (This related to the organization of the "Independed Key Authority.") - Can it be arranged that only a single message is openable? For example, that the key to the last 3 years of messages _not_ be released? (The authorities should only gain access to the _specific_ communication a search warrant is for, and not to all past messages, for example. And a "wiretap" court order, allowing reading of all messages, should also not allow reading of messages not covered.) - What about applications like cryptograhic voting, digital money, etc.? These systems often involve many keys, sometime generated during execution of the protocol. How could these be handled? - Psychologically (further afield from sci.crypt's charter), what will be the effect on public confidence in such things as digital signatures and timestamping if it is known that in principle the government (or others) could obtain the private keys? These and many other issues are clearly crypto protocol issues, albeit with some heavy political overtones. Sci.crypt is a much better fit to this issue than any other group I have seen. And it is far better that we discuss and debate this issue here and now with folks like Prof. Denning than that we ignore the issue and then read about it as a piece of proposed legislation. -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | PGP 2.0 and MailSafe keys by arrangement.
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Path: arc1-ca.pugleaf.net!sparky!uunet!ogicse!usenet.coe.montana.edu!decwrl!decwrl!netcomsv!netcom.com!tcmay From: tcmay@netcom.com (Timothy C. May) Newsgroups: sci.crypt Subject: Re: Back to crypto (registered keys) Message-ID: <1992Oct29.031316.10392@netcom.com> Date: 29 Oct 92 03:13:16 GMT Article-I.D.: netcom.1992Oct29.031316.10392 References: <7648@transfer.stratus.com> Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest) Lines: 54 X-Newsreader: Tin 1.1 PL5