🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <1992Nov20.092807.13613@ucsu.Colorado.EDU> cuffell@spot.Colorado.EDU (CUFFELL TIMOTHY MICH) writes:
>In this country, the accused is presumed innocent.  If there is not enough
>admissable evidence, then either we cannot assume his guilt, or, in the case
>of inadmissable evidence, a shortcoming in the law or a particular odius
>example of the price we pay to prevent a police state.  One might argue
>that an encrypted diary could prove his guilt.  This is true, in much the
>same way a illegal search or a coerced confession proves guilt.

No.  In the hypothetical case I described, he /was/ guilty--of
possessing an illegal cryptographic program--even though he wouldn't
decrypt what was thought to be a diary recording his evil deads.  This
was my point: in the battle to prevent restrictions on cryptography,
arguments of general unenforceability are of limited value.  Since most
folks don't consider cryptography as much use to themselves (there are,
after all, other ways to keep secrets), banning it to get at the bad
guys probably won't seem too high a price to pay--to "most folks", anyway.

>  The guilty
>going free on occasion is the price we pay for our freedoms.  The claim that
>the innocent have nothing to hide takes us one step from them.

Present a clear and immediate danger, and most people are quite willing
to see some of their freedoms suspended in exchange for removing that
danger.  This is human nature, and centuries of democracy have done only
a little to modify it.  Where is the clear and present danger to the
average citizen in banning private cryptography?  What secrets do average
people have which might require its use?  Remember, the institutions which
really need it, like banks, can be licensed for it, just like institutions
who need explosives, like mining companies, are licensed to use them.

>Here is a practical example.  You are accused of being a child molester.
>There exists on your computer an unidentifyable file, consisting of random
>data.  You now have to turn this data into a diary, or face criminal
>charges.

Who has ever proposed outlawing unindentifiable files?  If you managed
to destroy your encryption program, you're home free.  The program would
be the contraband, not a file which may or may not be its output.

There are, of course, problems with banning encryption programs: just
what /is/ an "encryption program?" I think that this is likely to be a
good avenue of approach for "unenforceability" arguments, but I'm also
not convinced that an enforceable definition is impossible.

Here is my point: until you come up with a way to explain to common
citizens how banning private cryptography will endanger them, you are
likely fighting a losing battle.  Much of what I've read in sci.crypt
has been preaching to the converted.  You'll have to do better by
finding demons as /immediately/ threatening as those of your adversary.

		-Ed Hall
		edhall@rand.org