🚀 go-pugleaf

Current policy is to allow export of cryptosystems of a certain weakness
provided they can't be strengthened.  I believe that this is a superior
policy to that of key registration.

The real concern isn't lawful interceptions and decryptions.  It's unlawful
ones -- by organized crime, criminals within the gov't, criminals with
"friends" in the gov't, ....

If the system is weak but the key is private, then the NSA can break the
system if there's a demand for it but it's unlikely that Joe Mobster can
break it.  I trust the NSA not to be in the pay of the mobs.  Meanwhile,
I'd be surprised if the NSA would bother breaking weak systems (eg.,
straight single CBC DES) just for fun (eg., as a favor to someone (like the
local police) legally authorized to do the interception).

If the system is strong but keys are registered, then Joe Mobster doesn't
have to build a decrypting machine or try to get a friend inside the NSA.
All he has to do is pay off someone at the registration center or otherwise
gain access.  He might, for example, get hired by the FBI (as a cover --
and for some side income -- and as a spy), use a judge who was bought by
the mob and walk up to the key registration center with a valid warrant.

-- 
-- <<Disclaimer: All opinions expressed are my own, of course.>>
-- Carl Ellison						cme@sw.stratus.com
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