🚀 go-pugleaf

Ross Anderson[2]
                            Steven M. Bellovin[3]
                               Josh Benaloh[4]
                                Matt Blaze[5]
                             Whitfield Diffie[6]
                               John Gilmore[7]
                             Peter G. Neumann[8]
                             Ronald L. Rivest[9]
                           Jeffrey I. Schiller[10]
                             Bruce Schneier[11]
 
                     Final Report -- 27 May 1997[12]
 
Executive Summary
 
A variety of ``key recovery,'' ``key escrow,'' and ``trusted third-party''
encryption requirements have been suggested in recent years by government
agencies seeking to conduct covert surveillance within the changing environ-
ments brought about by new technologies. This report examines the fundamental
properties of these requirements and attempts to outline the technical risks,
costs, and implications of deploying systems that provide government access to
encryption keys.
 
The deployment of key-recovery-based encryption infrastructures to meet law
enforcement's stated specific