Re: Bias in ACM and IEEE articles on cryptography

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Article #670

#670

From: "Don Coppersmith"
Date: Wed, 26 Aug 1992 14:27

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Andrew Haley ( ahaley@eoe.co.uk ) writes:

>                                    There's no point in using any more
> key bits, because differential cryptanalysis will find the subkeys in
> 2**47 operations whatever the key length.
........----------

The Biham-Shamir work requires 2**47 _chosen_plaintext_ messages,
not just that many operations.  Running 2**47 > 10**14 messages past
the machine that contains the secret key is _much_ trickier than doing
that many operations on your own machine.  This respresents massive
data that you've got to get out of your opponent's machine!

Don Coppersmith

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Path: arc1-ca.pugleaf.net!sparky!uunet!cis.ohio-state.edu!ucbvax!WATSON.IBM.COM!copper
From: copper@WATSON.IBM.COM ("Don Coppersmith")
Newsgroups: sci.crypt
Subject: Re: Bias in ACM and IEEE articles on cryptography
Message-ID: <9208261429.AA00938@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU>
Date: 26 Aug 92 14:27:35 GMT
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