🚀 go-pugleaf

The referenced article - which I'm certain will draw a large number of replies
from people happy to see their worst suspicions confirmed - is a load of non
sense.

The NSA does not protect DES.  It never has.  It certified DES as a crytographic
standard, and that certification is what is about to run out.

The NSA does not use DES to encrypt ANYTHING.  In fact, it is explictly ILLEGAL
to transmit government-classified information using only DES for encryption.
DES has NEVER been acceptable for such use.

"Unauthorized breaking of DES", whatever that might mean, is not treason.  In
fact, I rather doubt it, in and of itself, is a violation of any law whatsoever.
(The work involved MIGHT be considered classified - crytography and certain
aspects of nuclear physics having to do with bombs are in the special position
that information about them can be considered classified even if developed inde-
pendently - but even that's unlikely - the US government does not use DES for
sensitive information.)  There is plenty of open literature on methods for
attacking DES (most of which seem to indicate that it is, in fact, a pretty
strong cipher - while the practicality of brute-force attacks is known, and
there are some little hints here and there of POSSIBLE weaknesses, all attempts
at analytical attacks published so far indicate that a lot of correct decisions
went into the design of DES; variations have fallen to analytical attack, but
not DES itself.)

I find it extremely doubtful that if, indeed, the VideoCipher system has been
broken, that it's been broken by breaking DES.  A lot of very good people have
failed to break DES; I doubt a bunch of hardware hackers could do better.  That
does NOT mean that M/A-COM's USE of DES is correct; it may be that the particu-
lar way they use DES was not well thought out, and has been broken.

M/A-COM's warning about it being "possibly treasoness" to ship their boxes out
of the US is nonsense - scare tactics.  It MIGHT be illegal under various
Commerce Department regulations previously discussed in this group.  (Since it
is a decoder only, rather than a full ciphering/deciphering system only, even
that isn't clear.)

It would NOT be illegal, under those regulations, to ship decoder boxes INTO
the US.  Nor would it be illegal to sell them WITHIN the US.  These regulations
apply only to shipping FROM the US TO foreign countries.

The illegalities involved in producing and selling such boxes have nothing to
do with cryptography; they involve the same laws that make it illegal to sell
cable descramblers for simple "invert the sync pulse" encoding schemes.  That
is, what's ultimately involved is some sort of "theft of service", and the
producer/seller is prosecuted for being involved in some sort of conspiracy to
steal services.
							-- Jerry

> And it finally happened: _Videocipher_has_been_busted_.
> 
> DES and M/A-Com
> 
>   _Videocipher_II_ is protected by numerous U.S. laws.  It uses the
> DES encryption system that, until April 22, 1987, may be protected
> from unauthorized busting by the National Security Agency.  NSA is
> responsible for the security and integrity of the DES code, and uses
> it to transmit less-than-top-secret messages to military and embassy
> locations world-wide. 

So: does this mean they've busted DES or just the dynamic key management
used by the Videocipher II?  Can anyone explain without being treasonable?
[Breaking DES for under $1400.00 - even U.S. funds - sounds a neat trick!]
-- 
Richard Outerbridge	<outer@utcsri.UUCP>	 (416) 961-4757
Payload Deliveries:	N 43 39'36", W 79 23'42", Elev. 106.47m.

In article <12246@watnot.UUCP>, ccplumb@watnot.UUCP (Colin Plumb) writes:
> The following is excerpted from the January, 1987 issue of
> _Radio-Electronics_,
> 	......
> And it finally happened: _Videocipher_has_been_busted_.

This is wrong.  Videocipher (DES) has not been "busted" by anyone,
particularly garage hobbyists.

In article <3720@utcsri.UUCP> outer@utcsri.UUCP (Richard Outerbridge) writes:
>> And it finally happened: _Videocipher_has_been_busted_.
>
>So: does this mean they've busted DES or just the dynamic key management
>used by the Videocipher II?  Can anyone explain without being treasonable?
>[Breaking DES for under $1400.00 - even U.S. funds - sounds a neat trick!]

I'd say just M/A-Com's descrambler enabling system has been broken - breaking
DES in real time, for *any* amount of money, would be a neat trick!
I apologize for the fact the column wasn't well writen, but it seemed to be
relavent to the discussion here.  I should have added a disclaimer to the
effect that the views expresed in the quotation are those of the original
author, not me!

	-Colin Plumb (ccplumb@watnot.UUCP)

Zippy says:
I'm not an Iranian!!  I voted for Dianne Feinstein!!

P.S. I, too, would like to hear about how the cracking works... does anyone
out there know?

P.P.S. Probably the scheme involves some modifications to an existing
Videocipher box - in which case instructions for making the modification
shouldn't be any more illegal than posting diffs for copyrighted source -
probably less, since the box doesn't come with any sort of licensing agreement!

There have been several premature reports of the demise of
Videocipher-II.  One showed up on the Independent Network News a few
months ago. In it a satellite dish dealer first showed a reporter how
adding a capacitor to a Videocipher box would recover the video on an
unsubscribed channel (this was legit, but no surprise since everyone
knows that the video is easy to recover). Then he claimed that through
the use of an ordinary FM broadcast receiver, he could get the sound. 
Well, it was pretty obvious to me that he was just getting it from his
local CATV company, since many carry the sound for subscription channels
on the FM broadcast band (this is how you get stereo).  Several days
later, HBO made the same accusation, but the dish dealer denied that he
got the audio off a CATV system. He also refused to repeat the
demonstration. He claimed that he'd tell M/A-Com the details of his
scheme only if they'd agree to recall every Videocipher box -- an offer
M/A-Com is unlikely to accept.  You decide.

As far as I know, Videocipher represents the first time DES has been
used in a situation where the legitimate receiver is either apathetic or
actively hostile to keeping the keys secret.   Videocipher uses a
primary/secondary key scheme. The primary keys are used to decrypt an
encrypted secondary key which is sent over the satellite. This secondary
key can be fixed, or it can change periodically; each time it changes,
the box must decrypt it with the primary key and start using it to
decrypt the audio. Clearly, the primary keys are the "key" to cracking
the system.

Obviously, any subscriber can get as much matching plaintext/cleartext
as he or she wants, but this isn't of much use since DES has already
shown itself to be highly resistant to known plaintext attacks (i.e.,
you'll probably have to try all possible 2^56 keys in a DES chip of your
own until you hit the one that works). The security of the system
therefore depends entirely on the physical security of the primary DES
keys, which of course have to be in the box you sell to the customer.
They are kept in the unit in a register on a custom CMOS chip with
battery backup. Naturally, the chip is designed to make reading the keys
impossible.

Given that DES has withstood all (published) cryptanalytical attacks,
and that you can get physical possession of the primary keys by simply
buying a box, the most fruitful avenue of attack on Videocipher is
likely to be physical. Special solvents exist for dissolving epoxy off
ICs without damaging the chips, and special scanning electron
microscopes exist for reading voltage levels within operating ICs.  All
it takes is one motivated person with access to the necessary resources to
read the key registers, post the results to netnews, and the game will
be over.  Until then, I'm taking all reports of Videocipher audio
cracking with a large bag of salt.

Phil

It is not illegal to export cable decoders using the technology incorporated
in the M/A-COM VideoCypher I or II outside the United States; there is a
specific exemption in the export controls for this type of equipment.

		Kurt F. Sauer
		Oklahoma City, OK

-------------------------Start of Attachment
In article <4725@yale-celray.yale.UUCP> leichter@yale-celray.UUCP
(Jerry Leichter) writes:

>                                   ...  It MIGHT be illegal under various
>Commerce Department regulations previously discussed in this group.  (Since it
>is a decoder only, rather than a full ciphering/deciphering system only, even
>that isn't clear.)
>
>It would NOT be illegal, under those regulations, to ship decoder boxes INTO
>the US.  Nor would it be illegal to sell them WITHIN the US.  These regulations
>apply only to shipping FROM the US TO foreign countries.
>...
>							-- Jerry
>
-------------------------End of Attachment

Does anyone know where the key information is placed in the VC-II encryption
scheme?  It seems to me that if the information were stored in the horizontal
or vertical retrace that you could build a box that you could switch out, have
your favorite channel turned on, and then switch it back in and have it strip
out anything extra once it detects a retrace. Something similar might could
be done if they were using a portion of the picture that would normally be
taken up by the overscan on most TV's. Or are they doing something more
sophisticated by maybe putting another signal similar, but different, to the
audio portion?

It just seems that if they are not using some sort of public key encryption
to bootstrap into the DES then there is big hole out there. Your receiver is
receiving a key somehow. Even then, if you know where it is located and can
filter it out of the signal once it is turned on, that is as good as any
other black box. You just buy all the stations you want 1 time.

If I were a hardware jock, this would just seem to be a real interesting
"challenge". Something akin to the Scientific American article on RSA that
printed the encrypted message that used 60+ digit encryption keys and
offered some kind of award to anyone who could break it.

	Cheers,
-- 
Jeff Lee
CSNet:	Jeff @ GATech		ARPA:	Jeff%GATech.CSNet @ CSNet-Relay.ARPA
uucp:	...!{akgua,allegra,hplabs,ihnp4,linus,seismo,ulysses}!gatech!jeff

M/A-COM and the magazine quoted are full of shit.  The US
constitution defines treason as giving "aid and comfort to the
enemy in time of war".  The United States has not declared war
in over forty years.  Until such time as war is declared (on
someone besides "drug abuse" :-), it is IMPOSSIBLE to commit
treason.

OK, so this isn't cryptographic.  Idiocy should be combatted
wherever it appears.
_____________________________________________________
Matt		University	crawford@anl-mcs.arpa
Crawford	of Chicago	ihnp4!oddjob!matt

In article <12246@watnot.UUCP> ccplumb@watnot.UUCP (Colin Plumb) writes:
>The following is excerpted from the January, 1987 issue of
>_Radio-Electronics_, and as an example of the U.S. government's
>bass-ackward approach to secrecy, I feel this is almost unparalelled.
>
>--- Excerpt begins ---
>
>  _Videocipher_II_ is protected by numerous U.S. laws.  It uses the
>DES encryption system that, until April 22, 1987, may be protected
>from unauthorized busting by the National Security Agency.  NSA is
>responsible for the security and integrity of the DES code, and uses
>it to transmit less-than-top-secret messages to military and embassy
>locations world-wide.  In the M/A-Com view, anyone who tampers with
>DES or attempts to profit from decoding it is guilty of treason
>against the U.S. government.  Obviously, charges of treason are not to
>be taken lightly.

	Just a question (point?). I thought that charges of treason were
only valid during wartime and that during peacetime some other charge
(whose name escapes me) applies. Anybody out there clear on this point?


-- 
*******************************************************************************
Later y'all,             Vnend            Ignorance is the Mother of Adventure.
**UUCP:cbosgd!ukma!ukecc!vnend;                CSNET:vnend@ecc.engr.uky.csnet**
************BITNET:cn0001dj@ukcc.BITNET (but only as a last resort)************

> It just seems that if they are not using some sort of public key encryption
> to bootstrap into the DES then there is big hole out there. Your receiver is
> receiving a key somehow.

The primary/secondary key management scheme is designed to thwart
exactly this kind of attack. Yes, the keys your box needs to decrypt the
audio ARE sent over the satellite BUT they are themselves encrypted by a
different, "primary" DES key -- which is never sent over the air. The
primary keys (there are 4, of which one is active at any time) are
loaded into each Videocipher box as it is manufactured, and they sit in
registers on the DES chip. They cannot be read out through the device
pins, and dropping battery backup power to the chip destroys the key. 
As I said in my last message, the security of Videocipher lies entirely
in the physical security of these primary keys; if you can figure out
how to get them out of the chip, you've broken the system.

Rumor also has it that the Videocipher scheme has a "remote destruct"
command which allows M/A-Com to tell a box to forget the primary keys;
the box then becomes useless until it is returned to the factory for key
reloading. Now consider a future Captain Midnight figuring out how to
trigger this function. What a concept.

Phil

In article <7277@gatech.EDU> jeff@gatech.UUCP (Jeff Lee) writes:
>Does anyone know where the key information is placed in the VC-II encryption
>scheme?  It seems to me that if the information were stored in the horizontal
>or vertical retrace that you could build a box that you could switch out, have
>your favorite channel turned on, and then switch it back in and have it strip
>out anything extra once it detects a retrace. Something similar might could
>be done if they were using a portion of the picture that would normally be
>taken up by the overscan on most TV's. Or are they doing something more
>sophisticated by maybe putting another signal similar, but different, to the
>audio portion?
>

Basicly the VC-II system relies on having a "secure" audio portion and a 
basicly "protected" (breakable) video section.  The VC-II scrambling system
digitizes two audio channels (at approx the same rate used in compact disc's)
and then adds each digital sample to a random binary sequence generated by the 
DES algorithm and combines them with error coding bits.  The encrypted audio 
bits appear to be completely random.  These two audio channels, along with the
addressing and control information are digitally transmitted in place of the 
horizontal sync pulse in each video line as 88bits of PAM data.  (The video 
scrambling is accomplished by the absence of normal sync information, and 
video inverting.)  The exact pattern of how the bits are transmitted in the 
video frame is unknown to me (as it is one key in decodeing the signal)

The VC-II descramblers use a multilevel key hierarchy.  Each VC-II
has a unique public address and a DES key contained in a TI7000 microprocessor.
This key is 2 fold.  It is used by the VC-II to decode other keys and
2) to descramble the satellite signal if that channel is in "Fixed key mode".
(In this mode - any VC-II will decode the channel - no authorization
is required)

In the normal mode of operation though, each descrambler first receives a 
satellite message containing a monthly key along with service attributes.  If 
this key is not preceeded with the address of the unit.  It fails to 
store the key.  Then every satellite service is encrypted by the scrambler with 
a different program key.  The program key is combined with program attributes 
and is encrypted with the monthly key and broadcast over the control channel to
all descramblers.  Only those descramblers that correctly received the monthly
key will be able to decrypt the program key and decode the program.  The VCII
scrambling system repetitively transmits individual monthly messages to all
authorized descramblers in advance of changing the program keys.  Then by
changing keys at the program level, it can authorize and deauthorize 
a set of descramblers with one transmission.

From what I can tell, the various videocypher busting techniques are based
upon causing a VC-II decoder to change its ID to either a "MASTER" decoder
which pays for all the encrypted signals (and each clone then receives them
automaticly), or by changing the ID to random unit ID's and searching for
authorization messages.  General Instruments (the people that bought the
MA/COM division) have supposely changed how often the monthly key information
is transmitted in an attempt to frustrate the latter attempt.

In any case, the DES encryption system in the VC-II has not been the
target nor has it been broken in any of the VC-II decoding techniques.  I can
fail to see how the type of "hacking" people have been doing on the VC-II
could be considered treason.  I dont even think that the breaking of the 
encoding is illegal, although the use of such a device is.

In article <271@faline.UUCP>, karn@faline.UUCP (Phil R. Karn) writes:
> All it takes is one motivated person with access to the necessary resources
> to read the key registers, post the results to netnews, and the game will
> be over.  Until then, I'm taking all reports of Videocipher audio
> cracking with a large bag of salt.

The simplest motivation is money. Offer the right amount to the right
person and the game IS over!