🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <1992Nov10.000351.14645@samba.oit.unc.edu>, Robert.Vienneau@launchpad.unc.edu (Robert Vienneau) writes:

|> It is my impression that the philosophy of science is a recent

Define 'recent'.

|> speciality. For example, would you consider J. S. Mill or Hegel to be

No.

|> philosophers of science? How about Einstein or Bohr, who both discussed
|> methodological questions a lot? Poincare and Mach do fall in the

Absolutely.

|> speciality I want to consider, I think. (My knowledge of these writers
|> is almost exclusively through the secondary literature.) I consider
|> Wittgenstein's Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations to be of
|> importance, but not actually part of the field.

I can't imagine why you consider this particular work to be of central
importance in this area.

|> I consider these divisions so far to be of little importance, but I want
|> to see if we can locate some areas of agreement.
|> 
|> I am quite aware of the logical positivists, but have not actually read
|> Carnap, Nagel, or any other Vienna circle author. I have read Ayer, in
|> particular, his Language, Truth, and Logic. The reason I did not
|> mention them is that I assumed no philosopher took them seriously
|> anymore. Professors of philosophy may be another story.

Yes, this is typical of a certain type of education (which you may or
may not have been subjected to).  It is (certainly was; still is in
some venues) commonplace to trot out this single work of Ayer's as
representative of "logical positivism".  Then you dismiss the entire
positivist program based on this one work by one philosopher.  The
fact that you have not read Carnap, Nagel, and (presumably) Hempel,
Neurath, et al., but have managed to read (the early) Wittgenstein
and Ayer is indicative of both a narrow and slanted approach to the
field.  That you apparently wish to judge the contemporary state of
philospohy of science on the basis of this and ignorance of more
recent samplings speaks for itself.

|> Now for some points where I think you're definitely adopting
|> indefensible readings.
|> 
|> First off, some of the most important works of the philosophers I
|> mentioned were published before 20 years ago:
|> 
|>    Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery
|> 
|>    Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
|> 
|>    Lakatos, Proofs and Refutations
|> 
|> I do not remember the exact dates of Lakatos' later essays on SRPs, but
|> they are close. Also, Feyerabend's Against Method was published in 1975.
|> So Gary, do you want to retract this:

1975 + 20 = 1995.  1995 > 1992.  The arithmetic on this seems okay to me.
Kuhn's magnum opus was published in 1970.  He has published sequels and
responses to it since.  Likewise for Lakotos.  Likewise for Popper.  (By
the way, I just looked throuth *two* sets of proceedings of the Philosophy
of Science Association to nail down dates on Popper and could not find
a *single* reference to him in *any* of the bibliographies.  Is this a
measure of "stature"?)

|> >I mentioned the past 20 years because the people *you* mentioned were
|> >writing largely in this period.
|> 
|> More seriously, I also think you are mistaken to characterize these four as
|> being members of a school or as reacting against positivism. Popper's
|> the clearest case for your position, and even he is debatable. Did
|> Goedel react against the Vienna circle? How about the later

Huh?  Goedel?

|> Wittgenstein? Kuhn's primary interest is not even philosophy, but

Yes.  (Have you ever *read* the later Wittgenstein?  Or do you base
this on intuitions and "secondary sources"?)

|> history. Important people in his heritage that are not nearly as
|> important for my others include Herbert Butterfield and A. Koyre.
|> Lakatos could be said to either have developed Popper's ideas or to have
|> reacted against them. Feyerabend can be said to have explicitly
|> applied some of Wittgenstein's later ideas.

Do you have a point here?

|> Now you may not like any of these philosophers of science. You may even
|> want to consider the following work as being as prominent as any that I
|> have read: 
|> 
|> >	"Moderate Historicism and the Empirical Sense of
|> >	 'Good Science'" by G. H. Merrill
|> 
|> I can even see how you might to group them together to consider certain
|> theses about the relation between the history and the philosophy of

The way to see this is to *read* the above paper rather than to offer
opinions based on ignorance, as you seem inclined to do in general.
I may or may not "like" various philosophers of science.  I may or may
not *accept* their views and positions.  I may or may not offer
coherent criticisms against both the positivists, the "anti-positivists"
and the intellectual descendants of both.  But I've done my homework.
What was that you said about not knowing what one is talking about?


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Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
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