🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <13261@watmath.UUCP> erhoogerbeet@watmath.UUCP (Edwin (Deepthot)) writes:
>Though I am certainly no philosopher, I seem to remember this (heard from 
>someone about Descartes' ramblings).
>
>Let us assume that there is nothing that can be known for certain. Then,
>a contradiction is reached because we have taken as certain the hypothesis
>that nothing can be known for certain. Therefore, it must be so that you can
>know something for certain.
>
Did Descartes really say that? I'm disappointed.  Let X, in the
following sentence, be "nothing can be known for certain."
The truth of X does not imply that anybody KNOWS X.
(In the same way, there could well be a God or three without anyone
knowing for certain that such existed.)
Descartes should have been familiar enough with the difference
between truth and knowledge to realize that.

Playing Devil's advocate, I guess I should point out that a
statement which inherently cannot be proven is necessarily
irrelevant.  If X cannot be proven, then ~X cannot be disproven, so
~X is consistent with any possible universe and so tells us nothing
about which possible universe we're in.  (I would use this on
Creationists if I could get one to hold still long enough.)