🚀 go-pugleaf

>[gallagher@husc4.UUCP ]

>How do you distinguish science from non-science? Also how can the
>non-sciences  straighten  up  their act?  I've recently read some
>articles in historical biology (on the origin  of  bone),  and  I
>don't see how the sorts of evidence and the sort of reasoning the
>authors use differs from those used in the history of  human  so-
>ciety (which is not to say there is no difference)? How is a fact
>or a theory in a science like paleontology any more certain  than
>one in history or a social science?

History has some very scientific methods of fact verification.
There's no reasonable doubt now that Troy existed, or that
Pope Joan did not. 

History also contains *other* elements resembling fiction in  its
method  of  reality  reconstruction; also broad unverifiable gen-
eralizations  depending  for  their  acceptance  on  intellectual
fashion  or  political  climate. It is not *all* science or *all*
non-science. Similarly, there are scientfic *elements* in anthro-
pology  or  psychology.  

And, of course, not everything that is *not*  science  is  trash.
"Unscientific" need not be a pejorative term except as applied to
something that *claims* to be scientific. The problem arises when
"scientific" and "academic" are used as synonyms. 

When one quotes an accredited authority  on  a  scientific  fact,
e.g, the mass of a muon, that's for brevity: you *can* verify the
fact.

On the other hand, when one quotes an authority  on  the  subject
of,  e.g.,  future discoveries of science ("is fusion feasible in
this century?") - then the authority, *even of a scientist*  is
not  scientific.  

Opinions prevailing in academic circles are just that - opinions,
not science.

But in some soft-core "sciences" such prevailing opinions are the
dominant criteria of truth - though they tend  to  be  wrong  (as
judged by the opinions prevailing later). 

Can machines be made to  think?  Is  intelligence  heritable?  Is
overpopulation  imminent?   --  These are examples of interesting
nonscientific questions, though some  academics  reinforce  their
private speculations on these questions with the prestige of sci-
ence. The false pretense only detracts from the weight  that  an
honest opinion would have. 

It is quite right to say "this is the mass of a muon, as says
so-and-so who is a professor of physics, and in a position
to know". The fact *is* known, so being in the position of access
to this knowledge helps.

But it is quite wrong to say: "a fetus is (or is not) a human be-
ing, as says so-and-so who is a professor of ethics,  a  Ph.D  in
biology,  an  M.D. and a D.D.". The titles don't help because the
"fact" is *not* known, not even defined so as to *become* known.
And if, at a given moment, *all* academics agreed on it, it would
*still* be their private opinion, quite probably wrong.

			Jan Wasilewsky