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In article <51@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes:
[discussion of philosophical knowledge]
>
>I don't think, from this particular, here-and-now individual
>viewpoint, that one can make a valid distinction between belief and true
>belief.  To a person at a given time, *all* his beliefs are true beliefs.
				       ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>They only become false if he later disagrees with them (at
>which point they are, of course, no longer beliefs, but *former* beliefs), or
>if others disagree with them (at which points, they are not beliefs for those
>others).  So knowledge = belief = true belief, from the viewpoint of an
>individual at a given time.
>
>Sarge Gerbode
>Institute for Research in Metapsychology
>UUCP:  pyramid!thirdi!sarge

I'm not convinced of the portion high-lighted above.  It seems to me that
not all of my beliefs reflect true propositions (unless I'm incredibly
skilled in choosing what to believe).  Nonetheless, it is not true of
any particular belief p that I consider it to be false, otherwise I would
reject it and believe ~p.  Let us also assume that I have a finite number
of beliefs.
  Consider a much smaller scenario--one in which I have but three beliefs:

	1. Bel(p)
	2. Bel(q)
	3. Bel(~(p^q))

Surely if such a situation were to come about, you'd have no trouble
considering me to be inconsistent.  Yet my proposal is that we all
entertain a much greater version of precisely the same notion.  Are
we inconsistent, or just unreflective (are certain beliefs not questioned)?
Is this to deny

	4. Bel(Bel(p))

for some p?
-- 
  Jim Laycock		Philosophy grad, University of Alberta
  alberta!Jim_Laycock@UQV-MTS
    OR
  decvax!bellcore!ulysses!mhuxr!mhuxn!ihnp4!alberta!cavell!jiml