🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <573@rlgvax.UUCP> cliff@rlgvax.UUCP (Cliff Joslyn) writes:
[regarding Nozick's favoring of *explanation* over *proof* in philosophy]:
>
>I believe that this is very similar to something expressed by Kant in the
>Prolegmonena (although it has been many years since I read it), that
>explaning how something might be possible is really the task of metaphyics.

Indeed it is, but Nozick tries to distinguish his method from Kant's
in a footnote on page 15.  Here's his summation:
	There is a difference between explaining *p* via *q*, and
	proving *q* is the correct explanation of *p*.  A transcendental
	argument [Kant's technique] attempts to prove *q* by proving
	it is part of any correct explanation of *p*, by proving it a
	precondition of *p*'s possibility.

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"As regards those who adopt a *scientific* method, they have the choice
of proceeding either *dogmatically* or *skeptically*; but in any case
they are under obligation to proceed *systematically*.   I. Kant

Michael P. Smith	ARPA: mps@duke.cs.duke.edu
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