🚀 go-pugleaf

I have a lot of work these days, so I may not react to every article that
seems to ask for it. I do read them, however.

In article <91@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes:
>It seems that Biep is getting awfully complex, here.  Is there really a
>difference between methods and methodology?  Doesn't the "methodology" of a
>particular science, or of any activity, consist of a set of systematic
>methods for achieving the goals of that activity?

To me, "methodology" refers to the study; "a methodology" refers to a
framework of methods, means to achieve something. The relation between
a "method" and a "methodology" is to me a part-whole relation, where
a "methodology" also carries the notion of being the "top". That means:
one has "primitive" methods, which can be performed directly, and more
complicated methods, defined in (more) primitive ones. Any such method
defines a discipline (e.g. "volt-meter reading", or "making the dog happy"),
many of which may remain nameless. With respect to this discipline,
that "top" method is a methodology. So I think we don't really differ much.

Bob Myers had claimed that methodology was not as powerful as I made it, and
then asked me for a definition. That, not any disagreement with you, caused me
to write this article.

Of course, as I have written before, "philosophers aren't ready yet", that is:
there is not (yet) such a thing as a (complete) methodology for any complex
activity like doing science, and possibly there never will be (either because
it isn't possible, or because it's possible but unreachable, or for any other
reason).

>The "methodology" of any activity seems to me to be simply the means used to
>accomplish the purposes of that activity.  So painting has a methodology; so
>does making love (at least you can buy books about it!).

I agree, if "simply the means" includes the context of those means: when to
use them, etc. (if there is an "etc.").

>The methodologies of science, then, would consist of the means used in
>discovering empirical truths.  The methodologies of philosophy would consist
>of the means used to discover non-empirical truths. 

Except that I feel that a scientist may take the methodology of its
discipline for granted, and a philosopher shouldn't.

P.S.: Does "methods" mean something different from "means" to you?

 - - - - - - 

To Robin about your definition of philosophy: 

You can hold your definition, of course, however I think it a pity to see
so many, to me core-philosophical, things fall out. I think, however, that
the arts and the social sciences (including psychology) cannot take over
aesthetics from philosophy. Just like psychology cannot take over the
philosophy of truth and logics, it cannot take over that of beauty: there
is a way difference between the philosophical notion of truth (below the
level where philosophers start disagreeing) and any psychological notion
of conviction or whatever. There has to be.
About "arts": do you think about people like sculptors, or about "the arts"
as given at universities (humanities and the like)? Anyway, I think both
have a different point of view than philosophy has.
-- 
						Biep.  (biep@cs.vu.nl via mcvax)
	Their extreme materialism is proven by the fact
	 they say "nobody" when they mean "no person".