🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <866@klipper.cs.vu.nl> biep@cs.vu.nl (J. A. "Biep" Durieux) writes:
>
>       In article <3692@cit-vax.Caltech.Edu>,
>       myers@tybalt.caltech.edu.UUCP (Bob Myers) writes:
>>Where I had problems with your initial comments (way back when) was
>>your statement science is not creative: in particular, that the
>>methodology tells you what hypotheses to consider.
>
>        So let me challenge you to point out
>       something which is or was really creative in science. Then I'll
>       try to find a general rule catching that case. I'll promise to
>       avoid any conscious use of the hindsight criterion in the use
>       of the rule (but not in stating it, of course). I only hope I
>       will know something about the field you'll choose.

Ok. As I have said, I think the creation of hypotheses is the major
source of creativity in science. So... how about the Continental
Drift hypothesis in Geology, thought up to explain the fit of the
continents across the Atlantic. Where does it come from? How do you
get it out of the methodology?

Don't like it? Try Evolution. The idea that all present-day species
are descended from earlier, different ones. The idea in its simplest
form is what I'm talking about -- never mind Natural selection and all
that.

>1) I think I have good reasons to keep playing the devil's advocate. Not
>       that I don't believe scientific behaviour is creative, but my
>       current task is to build a system in which actors (say robots)
>       solve problems and make plans. One of the hopes I have with this
>       discussion is to find rules of behaviour that are absolute (=
>       programmable).

Problem solving is one thing. Science is another. In my mind, the
purpose of science is to explain phenomena, not solve problems.
By "explain phenomena" I mean create an isomorphism between the mind
of the scientist and physical reality. I think of hypotheses as
"test" isomorphisms. I don't see a link between this and "robots".

Incidently, I think this is the source of scientific beauty, too.
A beautiful theory is one which I understand (intuitively) and closely
approximates reality. Naturally, a simpler theory is easier to
understand. For example, planetary positions can be represented
by Earth-centered or Sun-centered coordinate systems, with equal
accuracy. Which one is the "right" one? I don't think there is a
right one. (So much for scientific "Truth".) But clearly, one is
easier to understand, to model within your mind.

>2) At the moment scientific behaviour is certainly creative, as (as I
>       have said) "philosophers aren't ready yet". You may hold they
>       never will be, and I don't disagree beforehand.
>
>3) This is just a question of definition, of course, but I think that
>       if a scientist makes conscious ("externalizes" ?) a methodo-
>       logical rule (or simply: a method, a way to do something), he
>       is doing philosophy. This is not true if he just uses some
>       conscious or unconscious rule. Now a methodology may contain
>       rules that state that a scientist should do so, i.e. that he
>       stops and reflects about how he has been trying to get things
>       done, and to find out which ways worked and which ways didn't.
>       At that point the scientist is doing meta-<discipline>.

I think it is silly to differentiate between science and philosophy
the way you do. Certainly, it is possible to define away all the
creativity in science and call it "philosophy", but what does that
gain you? I think it is impossible to completely define the
methodology ("they never will be"), and thus I see your distinction
between science and philosophy as essentially pointless.

For example, I could argue that Continental Drift or Evolution is a
framework in which geology or biology is done, i.e., it's part
of the methodology in some sense. That it is really meta-geology
or meta-biology, since these concepts greatly affect the way geologists
and biologists think about their fields. I think this is ridiculous,
though, because I think the purpose of these sciences is to explain
(create an understanding of, create isomorphisms between the mind of
the scientist and physical reality) their subjects (Earth processes
and Life, to oversimplify). And these "framework" ideas are certainly
part of explaining that. (Actually, I wouldn't say either of these
ideas are part of the methodology.)

Perhaps when I see how you deal with either of these two ideas I'll
understand what you mean better.


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Bob Myers                                         myers@tybalt.caltech.edu
			 {rutgers,amdahl}!cit-vax!tybalt.caltech.edu!myers