🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <128@thirdi.UUCP>, sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes:
***[paraphrasing] What we need is a definition of `knowledge'.
**A proper definition needs to identify the `genus' or class to which
**the concept belongs and the `differentia' or differences which
**distinguish the concept from others in that class.
**How about?:  genus = a hierarchial structure of inter-related thoughts
**    and      differentia = derived from actual sensations/perceptions
**		(i.e. from reality) integrated via logical
**		(non-contradictory) methods (i.e. through reasoning).
**Thus:  definition = a hierarchial structure of inter-related thoughts,
**			derived from actual sensations/perceptions
**			integrated via logical methods.
**Or a `short form': "a mental grasping of facts of reality".
**How do you like that definition?  If it is unsatisfactory, can you
**identify a clearer or more precise genus and/or differentia?
> I can't say I really understand what you mean.  What's "a mental
> grasping of facts of reality"?  "Knowing things"?
So (since you ignore the definition that I generated, I guess you
did not want a definition of knowledge afterall (as you stated that
you did in your original posting [?]).

> If this is the case, then I think that's quite a different thing from
> giving a definition.
> Some definitions might contain genera and differentia (like the classical
> "featherless biped"), but I don't think they *all* do.
> I prefer a simpler definition of "definition":
Actually I was defining `knowledge' and not `definition', but go
ahead and switch contexts if you like (it would help if signaled
before you turned!!).

> Let's call an object that is intended to convey a concept (a word,
> phrase, symbol, picture, gesture, etc.) a "token".  Then:
> Token A is a definition of token B iff Token A and token B refer
> to the same concept.
> Note that the relation "is a definition of" is commutative.  So B
> would also be a definition of A.
This sounds like a clear case of redundant, or too many, tokens; 
and not purposeful or useful `defining'.

> Latimer's notion of definition would not cover, for instance, ostensive
> definitions.  In the exchange:
> Q: "What is 'Jane'?" A: "[Points to Jane].",
This hardly seems like `defining' to me;  I would refer to it as
`pointing at' so as not to confuse or obscure what I in fact was doing.

> It is hard to think of hierarchical structures of genera.
No one ever said that clear pruposeful definitions were easy for
those who have poorly organized concepts!  Perhaps there is a
message for those who like to play Ring Around The Tokens.  ;-)

> Note that even this ostensive definition is commutative:
> Q: "[Points to Jane]?" A: "That is Jane."
And it is also cirular and largely useless (as a definition of a
concept).  How did you get off on this tangent anyway;  We were
discussing the definition of knowledge;  Right [?]
-- 
Eudaemonia,  Richard S. Latimer [(312)-416-7501, ihnp4!ihlpl!rsl]