🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <3893@cit-vax.Caltech.Edu> myers@tybalt.caltech.edu.UUCP (Bob Myers) writes:
>I'm saying that a theory is not a set of statements, but a manner of
>looking at the world that allows one to *make* true statements.  

Whew.  I thought we were gearing up for a substantive disagreement
about whether or not scientific statements can be true.  Now it's
clear we just disagree about what `theory' means, and I don't want to
take time to argue about that.  (I certainly agree that manners of
looking at the world are neither true nor false.)

>It is this conceptual model -- mass, F=ma, and the
>Newtonian reference frame -- that make up the theory of Newtonian Physics.
>Is it true?  This still seems (to me) a strange way of looking at a model.
>Can it produce true statements?  Yes.
>Have I clarified my position any?

Yes, and thanks for it.  But I'd like further clarification: What
exactly is left out of the theory of Newtonian Physics if we cast your
characterization of it into a statement: "There is mass, F=ma, and
there are Newtonian reference frames"?  Or to put it another way:  What
in a `conceptual model' isn't just a matter of what's believed by those
who adopt the model?  I take it that what's believed is susceptible of
evaluation with respect to truth.

--Paul kube@berkeley.edu, ...!ucbvax!kube