🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <174@thirdi.UUCP> sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes:
>1.  I differentiate between communication and the mere obtaining of
>infomation.  I can look at my hand, but I think it's going too far to call
>that a communication from my hand to me or from me to my hand.  If I'm
>driving a car, I think it's going too far to say I am communicating to my
>car.  Rather, what is going on is *perception* and *control*, respectively.
>*Communication*, as I see it, has to involve two individuals engaging in an
>intentional action -- one intending to receive and the other to give
>communication.

I don't think perception and control are in the same category as
communication.  Let me deal first with control, because I think ordinary
usage is clearly on my side here.

A general certainly communicates with his subordinates when he sends orders
to them.  Yet he is equally clearly exercizing control over them.  The
communication is the *means* for exercizing control; there is no one or the
other.

For perception, the case is less clear; we tend not to describe an event as
perception unless it is "direct".  It would not be stretching the definition
too far to call, say, gathering information by sending out informants as
"perception"; but I admit it is stretching it a bit.

On the other hand, I am quite willing to accept (and in fact do accept) that
when the details of perception are examined, they turn out to involve
communication as one of the component steps.  Specifically, communication
from the sense organ to the brain.

>For instance, if someone intercepts a letter I am writing, that is not a
>commmunication to that person because it was not intended for that person.

There does seem to be some requirement for intentionality in communication,
but I don't it is nearly so strong as to require that both parties be
persons.  I will point out that data transmissions between people and
computers, or even between two computers, are commonly termed communication.

I think it is sufficient that the sender intend that the recipient receive
the data.  This may either be a direct intentionality, or indirect.  (I.e.,
the sender may be a device set up by someone, who intends it to communicate.)

One might argue that communication requires transfer between *stored*
information on both ends.  This would rule out both the automobile and the
perception case, while still leaving in the cases with computers.  I think
this is an unnecessary restriction, however.

>So this would apply to my knowing what's going on in a part of my mind.
>It's like looking at my hand.  I can of course get data about repressed
>memories, etc., but it's going too far to call that a communication.

It depends, doesn't it, on *how* you get the information?  If you just
remember it, there doesn't seem to be any communication going on; but what
if it presents itself to you in a dream?  It seems in this case that the
dream is being used as a communications channel by one part of the mind to
communicate with your consciousness.

>This may be getting a bit far afield for this newsgroup.  If so, you can
>direct replies to sci.philosophy.tech, where I am cross-posting this article.

I have in fact done so.  Actually, does it belong here, or in
talk.philosophy.misc?  Barring loud objections, I am prepared to leave it
here.
-- 

Frank Adams                           ihnp4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka
Ashton-Tate          52 Oakland Ave North         E. Hartford, CT 06108


-- 

Frank Adams                           ihnp4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka
Ashton-Tate          52 Oakland Ave North         E. Hartford, CT 06108