🚀 go-pugleaf

Don't blame me, I voted for chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers).
>OK, and your assertion comes down to "if physicalism is true, then
>it's logically necessary that my replica would be conscious".

Very true; my syllogism proves nothing.  But neither does yours,
and that's the point I was trying to establish.

>But are there any grounds to believe the consequent, apart from prior
>faith in physicalism?

None.  I consider it to be the least hypothesis, however, which is why
I place faith in it.

>I don't doubt that consciousness arises from
>dynamic chemical reactions in the brain, but how on earth could
>it be logically necessitated by such processes?

It's not necessitated by the entire class of dynamic chemical reactions,
or else your car's engine would be conscious.  It's logically necessitated
by the *exact duplication* of a process known to cause consciousness.

Here's the argument as I see it:

   Assumption: Physicalism is true.

1) Consciousness arises wholly from the physical structure of the
   brain combined with its present dynamic neurochemical state.
   [This is a restatement of the assumption.]
2) You possess consciousness.
3) An exact copy of you would have the same brain structure and the
   same neurochemical state as you do.
4) Therefore, an exact copy of you would possess consciousness.

I don't see anything controversial in this argument except the assumption,
unless you want to deny statement #2.  As I said, none of this proves
anything; all it does is demonstrate the fallacy in your argument.

-- 
"This coffee is my blood, this breakfast burrito is my flesh.  And
 it cost me 89 cents, so get your goddamned own." - Jeff Lester, "Saint 11"