🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <1992Sep12.224753.2719@sco.com> evanh@sco.COM (Evan Hunt) writes:

>Here's the argument as I see it:
>
>   Assumption: Physicalism is true.
>
>1) Consciousness arises wholly from the physical structure of the
>   brain combined with its present dynamic neurochemical state.
>   [This is a restatement of the assumption.]
>2) You possess consciousness.
>3) An exact copy of you would have the same brain structure and the
>   same neurochemical state as you do.
>4) Therefore, an exact copy of you would possess consciousness.

Obviously, if you include the truth of physicalism is a *premise*,
you can get your conclusion.  However, physicalism is precisely
what's in question.  I asked for a reason to believe that the
facts about consciousness are logically necessitated by the
physical facts, *independent* of that assumption.  On the face
of it, the notion of a zombie replica of me certainly seems to
a logical possibility.  Why isn't it?

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."