🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <1992Sep3.035320.25221@unixg.ubc.ca> ramsay@unixg.ubc.ca (Keith  
Ramsay) writes:
> In article <1992Aug30.044437.19426@math.ucla.edu> 
> barry@arnold.math.ucla.edu (Barry Merriman) writes:
> |[...] I was thoroughly dissapointed
> |in their philosophical approach, by the way---the want to copy 
> |the gedanken exp style from physics, but the experiments they propose
> |as just a vague as the issues they are trying to clarify, unlike the
> |case in physics.
> 
> I think the use of thought-experiments originated in philosophy, so I
> am not sure it is fair to say that it is "copied" from physics.

Well, lets just say its been very succesful in physics, mainly because
the thought experiments were built on top of a very true theory
(Electromagnetism in the case of SR). The problem in phil is the 
thought experiments are often based solely on the biases of the experimenter,
not anything objectively true.

> I also
> think that the burden of proof is on you to that there is a sensible
> "cure" to the vagueness of these philosophical questions.

The ''cure'' is that their is no cure. That is, philosophers need
to realize that many issues defy precise definition and precise 
resolution. For example, trying to precisely define what 'life' is, or
'intelligence', etc, not to mention ethical and theological issues.

One simply needs to admit the intrinsic vagueness of these things, because
in all likelyhood they lack a precise definition (why should
'intelligence', for e.g., have a precise mathematical definition. Its
an evolved quantity---it need not have any concise description.)
This means one needs to simply ask different types of questions, and
look for different type of answers---only look where answers 
seem possible.

--
Barry Merriman
UCLA Dept. of Math
UCLA Inst. for Fusion and Plasma Research
barry@math.ucla.edu (Internet; NeXTMail is welcome)