🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <1992Sep4.002657.2346@math.ucla.edu>, barry@arnold.math.ucla.edu (Barry Merriman) writes:
|> In article <Bu01JK.C4y@unx.sas.com> sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com (Gary Merrill)  
|> writes:
|> > 
|> > 
|> >  Most of this stuff is lifted from an old paper of my
|> > wife's:  "Can Darwinian Inheritance Be Extended from Biology to
|> > Epistemology?",
|> 
|> This provides a good example of what I consider the bad philosophy
|> of science. Not your wifes paper (she is essentially correct), but
|> the fact that philosophers would try to abstract Darwinian evolution
|> and then go around asking if this or that thing is a Darwinian evolution.

There is nothing wrong with such abstraction in itself, and such
a move can yield additional insight (for both philosophers and
scientists).  If you don't allow such abstraction (or encourage
it) you tend to limit the generality of your theories and restrict
the domains to which they apply.  I think you probably agree with
this.

|> As usual, the philosophers desire to develop a theory of some 
|> incredibly grand thing (epistemology), and end up with useless 

I'm not sure I can dispute the "as usual" claim if this in fact
is statistically based.  But I would say "not always".

|> mush. The value of Darwins (and derived) theory of evolution is that it answers  
|> questions about how traits are acquired and fixed in populations, how
|> new species develop, etc. When coupled
|> with genetics, it provides a complete, quantitative and predictive mechansim
|> for biological evolution. 

One of Carla's principle observations in this area (as would be the
observation of any biologist), is that *without* genetics (indeed
without *molecular* genetics) Darwin's theory would have gone the
way of Lamarcks.  Without a theory concerning the mechanism of
inheritance, Darwin's theory would be left twisting in the wind.
And you can't then just take the theory divorced from this underlying
theory and start drawing analogies to the partial theory.

|> Epistemology is simply not open to a similar degree of quantification.

This is arguable.  But certainly *this* case was not a successful
attempt.

|> Even if epistemology did turn out to be a 'Darwinian system'
|> by someones definition, that doesn't change what epistemology is: the
|> historical development of ideas would still be a very vague, unpredictible
|> process lacking simple unifying ideas, and certainly little predictive
|> power, as there is no underlying genetic code which enforces an
|> orderly development process.

Exactly.  And this embodies (or at least hints at) a criticism I have 
so far refrained from voicing:  Suppose these guys *could* get it
right -- that they could establish a close analogy all the way down
to the genetic level.  This is still not a theory of knowledge (epistemology)
in the usual sense.  Are we supposed to abandon concerns about inference
techniques, acquisition of knowledge, criteria for choosing among competing
theories, and just say "Well, it just happens"?

|> 
|> > And the source of new concepts
|> > is not located in other concepts, but in the mental activity of
|> > some human being.  Consequently, the way in which concepts are
|> > "inherited" is very unlike the way in which genes are inherited.
|> > Genes replicate themselves, but concepts must be "replicated" by
|> > human beings. 
|> 
|> 
|> At the level of the mushy theory desired by the philosopher, one
|> could easily refute these criticisms. Genes only replicate themselves
|> upon a given chemical subtrate. This substrate is prone to mutation. One
|> could say human minds are the substrate on which ideas replicate, and it
|> just happens to be a substrate very prone to mutation. 

Not so good, I think.  The weak point is "ideas replicate".  Mechanism
please?  And you still have the part/whole problem of splitting and
combining genes that has no obvious analogy here.  It still falls apart.
-- 
Gary H. Merrill  [Principal Systems Developer, C Compiler Development]
SAS Institute Inc. / SAS Campus Dr. / Cary, NC  27513 / (919) 677-8000
sasghm@theseus.unx.sas.com ... !mcnc!sas!sasghm