🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <7560@skye.ed.ac.uk>, jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:

>And some other people say functional organization is irrelevant, that
>any distinction apart from those based on behavior is arbitrary, etc.
>You and Searle (and I) are on the same side in thinking that something
>else is (or may turn out to be) relevant.
>
>I think this is an important issue, because it seems to me that many
>on the net are indeed "in the grip of an ideology" (as Searle says,
>though it may not be exactly the ideology he identifies).  So far as I
>can tell, the ideology is something like a verificationist (or
>falsificationist) philosophy of science, coupled with a dismissive
>attitude towards questions or claims that aren't scientific (as so
>defined).

Jeff, accusing people of being "in the grips of an ideology", as
Searle calls it is nothing but sophomoric name-calling. Why is it more
"ideological" to believe that behavior is sufficient than to believe
that behavior is *not* sufficient?

And you are wrong, as I have pointed out many times before, to
associate the view that intelligence, consciousness, etc. are
behavioral is identical with verificationism. I am not in any way a
verificationist.

>I then have to wonder what their attitude would be towards
>certain other "unscientific" questions, such as: what rights do we
>have?, should they be extended to machines?, to amimals?  If we can't
>ever have good reasons for deciding such questions one way or the
>other, if reason is helpless in cases that can't be "verified", then
>all that's left is power: who's right is whoever wins.

The problem you are worried about isn't peculiar to verificationists.
Even if everyone believes that there is absolute right and wrong, and
even if everyone believes that there are means to establish truth
beyond logic and empiricism, you are still stuck if (1) people
disagree about what is true, and (2) people disagree about what is a
good way to reason about truth.

Thus your complaint boils down to: there is a problem if people can't
agree on important things.

>Indeed, I think some people are fortunate that the debate has been
>focused on the obscure philosophical issue of intentionality rather
>than on, say, free will, where the moral, ethical, and political
>issues might be more visible.

The nice thing about philosophical discussions is that you can explore
alternatives (you can get beyond your natural ideology) without having
to worry about dire consequences if you happen to be wrong.

Daryl McCullough
ORA Corp.
Ithaca, NY