🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <dd0nhy+.kmc@netcom.com> kmc@netcom.com (Kevin McCarty) writes:

>>(1) Indistinguishable brains give rise to indistinguishable states
>>of consciousness.
>>
>>(2) Our reports of our conscious states, by and large, accurately
>>reflect those states.
>>
>>(3) Our memories of conscious experiences aren't radically mistaken,
>>by and large.
>
>You realize of course, that your theory which uses a functional
>explanation of why we *think* we have qualia regardless of whether we
>actually *do*, violates your 2nd principle of plausibility.

Not so.  Nothing in my position implies that our reports of
consciousness don't accurately reflect the contents of our consciousness.
It's just that the relation between these two isn't as simple as
billiard-ball causation.  See my postings on the coherence of the
explanatory bases of both consciousness and claims about consciousness;
this notion of "coherence" is motivated precisely by principle (2)
above.

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."