🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <Bv9BKL.IIs@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:
>
>Well, this seems to be the net.physicalist.position.of.choice.  Qualia
>just *are* physical events; don't ask why.  Unfortunately, it's
>entirely unsatisfactory.  For this position to be any good, you have to
>provide some reason why God couldn't have created a world with isomorphic
>physical events, but no qualia.

Thought is a physical event with physical effects, some of them externally
visible.  The physical events represented by qualia could not be subjects
of thought if there were no qualia.

>                                            Either way, the call for
>an entailment relation (or alternatively, the call for an explanation
>of why qualia exist at all) is being evaded entirely.

Surely qualia exist (i.e. evolved) so as to allow the physical sensory
input to become a component of thought.