🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <Bv9AIx.HBz@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:
>In article <1992Sep25.145109.20168@guinness.idbsu.edu> holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:
>
>>Show me a point of difference between my conscious experiences and the
>>corelated physical events in my brain.  I know that I use different
>>language to talk about them; that doesn't constitute evidence of a
>>difference.
>
>Just about anything -- e.g. the blueness of my blue-experiences.
>If the facts about my brain were exhausted by the facts given to
>us by physics, then there'd be no reason to suppose that there
>were any blue-experiences going on at all.
>
>-- 
>Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
>Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
>"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."

But this is not a point of difference.  There is nothing to indicate
that a physical system does not have "subjective blueness"; we simply
do not know how to ask such a question.  And I do NOT think that
"blueness" is an additional property of "blue-experiences"; I think it
is the bare identity of a factor in "blue-experiences" (which factor
is a physical event of some kind).
-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu