🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <Bv9B5E.Hz7@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:
>In article <1992Sep25.144907.20077@guinness.idbsu.edu> holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:
>>In article <Bv4B8r.FG9@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:
>
>>>The facts about consciousness, it seems to me, are not [entailed
>>>by the physical facts].  Nobody so far has
>>>provided a hint of an argument as to why they might be,
>>
>>Yes, indeed, someone has.  You have yourself.  You gave a complete
>>explanation of why intelligent beings would believe they have qualia
>>and say they have qualia, whether they do or not.  You are then in the
>>peculiar position of saying that your talk about qualia has no
>>connection with your qualia at all!!!  In fact, it is logically
>>possible (in your view, applied from my standpoint) that David
>>Chalmers is a zombie, expounding the valid (for you) argument that
>>facts about qualia must be separate from physical fact, and convincing
>>some of us people with qualia of this fact about ourselves (and maybe
>>some of us zombies, too).  Notice that the qualia are _completely out
>>of the loop_.
>
>The point is, no matter how much you dislike epiphenomenalism, that
>this is in no sense a demonstration of an entailment relation.  For
>that to go through, you'd have to hold that talk about qualia is
>*logically sufficient* for qualia themselves: i.e., that a qualialess
>system that talked about its qualia was not only empirically silly
>but conceptually incoherent.  And that's what's obviously false.
>The physical facts *entail* that a system will talk about qualia,
>which in turn *suggests* very strongly that the system has qualia,
>but it certainly doesn't *entail* it, unless you're a behaviourist
>about qualia (which I think, at bottom, that you're not).
>
>>>do below.  (To be fair, Randall Holmes has provided an argument,
>>>but it's less a demonstration of an entailment than an assertion
>>>that the alternative, epiphenomenalism, is logically impossible.)
>>
>>But I did not say this.  I think that treating consciousness as
>>epiphenomenal is silly.  We certainly could insist to the bitter end
>>that the facts about consciousness are different from the physical
>>facts, but we can only do so _by fiat_, if your account of the
>>physical facts, or anything like it is correct (which I accept as
>>being the case).
>
>Look: you need more than "epiphenomenalism is silly" for your
>argument.  For your argument above to go through, you literally
>need "epiphenomenalism is logically impossible", which it
>manifestly isn't.
>
>I certainly agree that the best argument for physicalism is
>"Consider the Alternatives" -- neither epiphenomenalism nor
>interctionist dualism are attractive positions.  But currently
>we're considering physicalism on its own terms -- which
>require an entailment relation.  It's no good slipping out of
>the call for such an entailment by pointing to how bad things
>will be if physicalism is false.
>
>>>other way around.  You show me a *good* physical explanation of
>>>consciousness, and I'll accept physicalism.  Right now, I don't
>>>have a ghost of a clue what such an explanation would come to,
>>>and neither, it seems to me, does anybody else.
>>
>>As I said, you gave the explanation yourself.
>
>And as I said, an explanation of why we talk about qualia isn't
>remotely close to being an explanation of qualia themselves.
>
>-- 
>Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
>Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
>"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."


By asking for an "entailment", you _assume_ a difference between the
two sets of phenomena.  I claim that there is no reason to assume such
a difference.  I can imagine worlds in which it would be reasonable to
conclude that there was such a difference; but we do not live in one
(so far as I can tell).  Being able to imagine something is not the
same as constructing a logically possible world.  I assume that there
is no difference between the phenomena until I see some way in which
they behave differently (in the most general sense of "behave"; I am
not talking "behaviourism").  This is not "fiat" unless there are
points of difference between the events already established; but there
are no such points of difference established; there are, of course,
obvious differences in our information about the two classes of
events, but using these to conclude that the events themselves are
different is unsound, even if you dress it up with talk about possible
worlds; "a world which we can imagine that we live in" (on the basis
of our information) is not "a logically possible world".
-- 
The opinions expressed		|     --Sincerely,
above are not the "official"	|     M. Randall Holmes
opinions of any person		|     Math. Dept., Boise State Univ.
or institution.			|     holmes@opal.idbsu.edu