🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <1992Oct07.184641.129725@Cookie.secapl.com>, frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams) writes:
> In article <1992Oct7.013230.20350@tamsun.tamu.edu> e343mh@tamuts.tamu.edu (Michael Hand) writes:
>>Frank Adams writes:
>>>If I assert, "I saw the man come in.  He was tall, thin,
>>>brown-haired, wore glasses, and smoking a cigar.", and it turns out his hair
>>>is actually black instead of brown, you don't necessarily conclude that my
>>>assertion was "false".  It *do* conclude that it was not correct in every
>>>detail.
>>
>>No, you don't *necessarily* conclude this, but it's true anyway -- 
>>assuming the definite description successfully denotes.  The second
>>claim is a conjunction, and is thus false if even one conjunct is
>>false.
>>Does this really need pointing out in sci.philosophy.TECH, for x's sake?
> 
> It is correct that a literal interpretation of my statement is false (under
> the given assumptions).  But the essential import of my statement is not
> this literal interpretation, but rather more like, "he looked approximately
> like this".  And *this* is not falsified by my being incorrect about some
> details.
> 
> This kind of imprecision is very common in ordinary discourse.  Any theory
> of human utterances which fails to take it into account is grossly
> insufficient, and it is not surprising that such a theory might produce
> absurd results like "scientific theories are not assertions".

You're absolutely right to bring up imprecision (pragmatic theories do
take it into account; in fact it's a central idea; see my remarks on the
original thread).  But the example you chose (the black hair and the
brown hair) doesn't work in any context *I* can imagine.

-- 
-Ken <miner@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu> {Sometimes you have to look reality straight
 OPINIONS ARE MY OWN            {in the eye, and deny it. - G. Keillor