🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <Bv9BKL.IIs@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:
>In article <1992Sep25.194311.138446@Cookie.secapl.com> frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams) writes:
>
>>What I am asserting is that you are looking for (insisting on) the wrong
>>kind of explanation of consciousness, and that the reason you are looking
>>for this kind of explanation is that you refuse to take seriously the idea
>>that you are a physical system.  If you really accept this, then an
>>explanation in the form "these aspects of the system are your
>>consciousness; when it gets these kinds of inputs, it reacts in this kind
>>of way, which is your qualia" *is* a full explanation of consciousness. I
>>don't think it is necessary to *agree* that "you are a physical system" to
>>understand this; although for me personally, when I understood this point,
>>my last objections to physicalism disappeared.
>
>Well, this seems to be the net.physicalist.position.of.choice.  Qualia
>just *are* physical events; don't ask why.  Unfortunately, it's
>entirely unsatisfactory.  For this position to be any good, you have to
>provide some reason why God couldn't have created a world with isomorphic
>physical events, but no qualia.  And that's what you can't do.  Note
>that "qualia are physical, therefore She couldn't" is utterly circular,
>as the physicality of qualia is precisely what's at issue.  (Though
>the passage above suggests that you want to be able to take it as an
>unquestioned axiom.)

Step back a moment, and imagine that you are a computer which has been
programmed/learned to be conscious.  (Assume that the structure of the
program is enough like the way the brain works that it is *really*
conscious, not just "faking" it -- I think "faking" it is impossible in the
real world, but I could be wrong.  N.B. This note is not directed at those
who believe real AI to be impossible; but based on his postings, I doubt
that Mr. Chalmers falls into this category.)  You ask, "what are my qualia"?
They are the interactions of your self (a portion of a computer program
running on a computer) with the outside world.  "But why do I feel them?"
Because you are this system, and feeling is part of what you do.  What other
kind of explanation is even conceivable for such questions?