🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <Bup1Hs.Dxn@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:

>Some people, such as Dennett, take this as a reduction of the
>very notion of phenomenal consciousness -- if we can explain
>anything we say or believe about consciousness without postulating
>consciousness itself, then why not just say that consciousness
>is an non-existent illusion? 

It seems flase to me that we can explain >anything we say or believe
about consciousness without postulating >consciousness itself.  Why
do you think it is the case?

>In any case, one at least wants some kind of coherence between
>the two sides of the story that doesn't leave them completely
>alienated from each other -- if they were, then there would be no
>reason to suppose that the things we say about consciousness reflect
>anything about the contents of our consciousness.  To do this, one
>can at least require that the explanatory basis of consciousness in
>the physical coheres with the explanatory basis of our claims about
>consciousness.  Given that the explanatory basis of our claims about
>consciousness can be given in entirely functional terms,

Um, how do you know that?  I've yet to see such an explanation,
or even hear of one.

-- jd