🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <26646@castle.ed.ac.uk> 
cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm) writes:

>In article <burt.718400899@aupair.cs.athabascau.ca>
>burt@aupair.cs.athabascau.ca (Burt Voorhees) writes:

>>wadley@mullauna.cs.mu.OZ.AU (Gregory Robert Wadley) writes:

CRW:
>>>I'm reading "Consciousness Explained" by Dan Dennett.

BV:
>>  I can tell you my reaction ...
>>exercise of his ego .... sell me a bill
>>of goods ... rather patronizing attitude ... offensive ...
>>arguments ... not convincing .... agree with ...
>>Zelaney that the book was intellectually dishonest.

CM:
>Despite promising us a detailed review, and being asked detailed
>questions by a number of posters, Zeleny in the end refused to make
>any detailed criticisms, contenting himself with his usual well-turned
>sneers. Care to give some examples of why you found the book
>unconvincing and dishonest, or did you just want to share your
>feelings with us?

This is hardly fair, Chris.  In between my usual sneers, I managed to cite
Dennett's ludicrous way of dealing with objections from McGinn, Nagel, and
Searle, giving both page numbers and reasons for my thinking so (e.g his
bizarre qualitative distinction between a computer program and a "mere"
look-up table, of which a great deal was made in subsequent conversation).
In the ensuing discussion, I made a more substantive point, by observing
that Dennett's underlying idiom of "intentional stance" rests on precisely
the same kind of representational opposition between subject and qualia, or
sign and object, as the one his theory implicitly denies.  While the former
observation substantiated my charges of intellectual dishonesty, and
eventually mutated into an inconclusive debate on implementation between
Dave Chalmers and myself, the second one, in my opinion, constitutes an
even better way of refuting Dennett's reductionist views than the alleged
_reductio ad absurdum_ by way of gainsaying his denial of qualia.  For a
logical self-contradiction is a far greater offence to reason than a
paradoxical, counterintuitive conclusion.  Thus I contend that I fulfilled
my obligation by substantiating my characterization of Dennett as a
charlatan or an ignoramus.

>-- 
>Chris Malcolm    cam@uk.ac.ed.aifh          +44 (0)31 650 3085
>Department of Artificial Intelligence,    Edinburgh University
>5 Forrest Hill, Edinburgh, EH1 2QL, UK                DoD #205

cordially,
mikhail zeleny@husc.harvard.edu
"Nous donnons la mort, nous saurons la subir."