🚀 go-pugleaf

Interesting discussion, I didn't catch the start so I apologize if I
repeat what others have said.

In article <1992Sep29.130441.29896@sophia.smith.edu>, orourke@sophia.smith.edu (Joseph O'Rourke) writes:
|> In article <Bv9vGp.Ax3@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:
|> 
|> >Precisely what needs to be explained is why that [blue] radiation "feels"
|> >like anything at all -- i.e. why that all physical processing is
|> >accompanied by an experiential feel [...] 
|> >There is also the secondary question
|> >of why it feels like *that* rather than like *this* -- it seems
|> >perfectly coherent that our blue experiences and red experiences
|> >could be systematically inverted, for instance. [...]
|> >Evolution is irrelevant to the question of why *this* physical
|> >s[t]ructure gives rise to *this* experiential feel.
|> 
|> We seem to be getting to the crux of the dispute here, not only
|> between you and other netters, but between e.g. Dennett & Block (say).
|> So let's pursue this further.
|> 
|> You want an explanation of two facts:
|> 
|> 	1. Why we feel at all.
|> 	2. Why it feels like this rather than like that.
|> 
|> Despite your rejection of evolution, I believe it can give a type
|> of answer to both.  We feel because it is evolutionarily advantageous
|> to experience pain, to have our pulse quicken at sharp sounds, etc.
|> And perhaps it is neurologically most efficient for these survival
|> advantages to be implemented via experiential feel, rather than
|> zombie reactions.

Well I don't know about neurological efficiency, but it seems that
evolutionarily speaking it might be advantageous to have a non-zombie
reaction to pain stimuli. First of all, pain stimuli are often associated with
situations where you need to flee or fight, in both cases the body needs
to be in a fairly high metabolic state; elevated heart rate etc. Second, it
seems advantageous to be conscious of pain (i.e. be able to think about it)
so that one can figure out why one is in pain. That way one can avoid similar
situations in the future, or one can choose to ignore the pain if the
situation requires. 

|> 	Why this rather than that may again answer to what is
|> most advantageous and most efficient:  there is some sense to
|> experiencing blue as darker than red, since it *is* darker;
|> so inverting blue and red might weaken other cues of the experiential
|> feel, other uses.  So perhaps inverted spectra are perfectly possible,
|> but just not a wise use of neurological resources.

This reminds me of the experiment where some guy wore image inverting goggles
for an extended period of time. After a week or two the world seemed right
side up with the goggles on and upside down with them off. His sense of up and
down eventually returned to normal after he stopped wearing the goggles.

Larry Edwards