🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <7652@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
>In article <Bup1Hs.Dxn@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:

>It seems flase to me that we can explain anything we say or believe
>about consciousness without postulating consciousness itself.  Why
>do you think it is the case?

Because we can explain behaviour in physical terms, in principle,
and the things we say about consciousness are part of our
behaviour.  If one believes (as I do) that consciousness does not
logically supervene on the physical, the conclusion falls out.

>>Given that the explanatory basis of our claims about
>>consciousness can be given in entirely functional terms,
>
>Um, how do you know that?  I've yet to see such an explanation,
>or even hear of one.

An explanation exists in principle for the above reasons.  As for
a very tentative example of how such an explanation might go, see
my paper "Consciousness and Cognition", or the sketchy summary
in previous articles.  The details of such an argument don't
need to be given for the in-principle point to remain valid,
however.  Behaviour is physically caused, so one can explain
behaviour (in principle) in terms of patterns of physical causation.

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."