🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <BvzuxI.Hqv@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:
>In article <7653@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
>
>                 it's clear that my zombie
>twin would go around *claiming* to have qualia, even though he
>didn't, and one can ask similar questions about the justification
>of those claims.

Well, this is true, but it's not clear that is shows anything
interesting in itself.  That is, I don't think it shows very much
that a zombie _claims_ to have qualia.

>>>On the first question, though, it seems to me that the functional
>>>explanation of why we think we have qualia may actually be
>>>quite straightforward.  In fact, it seems to me that any
>>>system with a reasonable capacity for perceptual discrimination,
>>>say between different waveforms of light, as well as a reasonable
>>>capacity for reflection, would have such beliefs.  They make
>>>certain discriminations (causally) between different kinds of
>>>waveforms, A and B, and then you ask them how they made the
>>>discrimination.
>>
>>Where do the qualia come in?
>
>The qualia don't come in to this explanation, as this is an
>explanation of *behaviour*, and as such is entirely physical.

I thought it was supposed to be at least "the functional explanation
of why we think we have qualia" (and not just of why we behave as
if we think we do).  

Anyway, I, at least, think I have qualia, and I don't just behave as
if I think so.  Moreover, the reason I think I have qualia is that I
have them and can tell that I do.  Qualia are therefore part of 
the explanation of my behaviour, but wouldn't be part of the
explanation of a zombie's behaviour (because a zombie doesn't
have qualia).

-- jd