🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <Bvzunq.BG6@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:
>In article <7652@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
>>In article <Bup1Hs.Dxn@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:
>
>>It seems false to me that we can explain anything we say or believe
>>about consciousness without postulating consciousness itself.  Why
>>do you think it is the case?
>
>Because we can explain behaviour in physical terms, in principle,
>and the things we say about consciousness are part of our
>behaviour.  If one believes (as I do) that consciousness does not
>logically supervene on the physical, the conclusion falls out.

So a lot turns on the definition of belief as disposition to 
behave.  For otherwise we couldn't explain what we believe
about consciousness merely by explaining behavior (though we
might still explain what we _say_).

Nonetheless, I don't think you can explain all we believe about
consciousness in this way even if belief is mere behavioral disposition.
Some of what I (at least) believe about consciouisness is because of
my experience of consciousness.  I know something about what it's like
to be conscious and thus believe certain things about it.

Behavior like mine might result in a different way.  Something
that wasn't conscious, with no experience at all, might nonetheless
have similar (maybe even identical) dispositions to behave.  _Those_
dispositions would not be because of any experience of consciousness.
They could be explained without involving consciousness, because
consciousness is not in fact involved in their production.
But that does nothing at all to show the same is true of _my_
dispositions (or those of any other conscious entity).

>>>Given that the explanatory basis of our claims about
>>>consciousness can be given in entirely functional terms,
>>
>>Um, how do you know that?  I've yet to see such an explanation,
>>or even hear of one.
>
>An explanation exists in principle for the above reasons.  As for
>a very tentative example of how such an explanation might go, see
>my paper "Consciousness and Cognition", or the sketchy summary
>in previous articles.  The details of such an argument don't
>need to be given for the in-principle point to remain valid,
>however.  Behaviour is physically caused, so one can explain
>behaviour (in principle) in terms of patterns of physical causation.

Suppose behavior is (entriely) physically caused.  Now, suppose
consciousness is a pattern of physical causation.  How could you then
say that the explanation of behavior needn't involve consciousness?

So far as I can tell, it simply is the case that the behavior of
conscious entities is caused in part by their consciousness.  This
leaves us a choice between (roughly):

  1. Behavior isn't (entirely) physically caused.

  2. Consciousness is effectively physical.

At present, I don't think I have a strong preference between those
two, but I'd take either of them over an epiphenomenalism that makes
consciousness irrelevant.

-- jd