🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <Bw1s8p.Mtp@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:
>In article <7668@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
>>In article <1992Sep17.154637.9156@guinness.idbsu.edu> holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:

>>Not so.  When two things are actually the same it can still be
>>logically possible for them to be different.  Not always, though.
>>You have to figure out which case you're in.  But you don't always
>>have to know two things are actually different to know that it's
>>logically possible for them to be different.

I agree with what you say below.  "Things that are the same" is
somewhat imprecise talk that seems to have gotten me into trouble.
It's probably not worth trying to explain further.

>Not quite.  On the standard line, two things that are identical
>are necessarily identical: how could something be other than
>itself?  Take a look at Kripke's _Naming and Necessity_, for
>instance.  However, what can be the case is that two *descriptions*
>that pick out the same thing in the real world pick out two
>different things in other possible worlds.

Ok, I knew this, and have read and remembered _Naming and Necessity_.
Randall Holmes has told me he's a professional logician and knows
all about this (and the other relevant issues).  But I must say it
sure looked to me like he was misunderstanding you and applying the
wrong notion of possibility.  Moreover, even now his argument against
your argument looks wrong to me.

So I would appreciate it if one, or both, of you could come up
with a version of his argument that even I could understand.

-- jd