🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <7670@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
>In article <1992Sep18.172123.14367@mp.cs.niu.edu> rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) writes:
>>In article <7525@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
>>>The net is wall-to-wall with people who insist on the claim that some sort
>>>of behavior (as in the Turing Test or Harnad's Total Turing Test) is
>>>all that we should (or can!) count as evidence of consciousness.  Such
>>>things as functional organization count for nothing, in their view.
>>
>>  I see relatively few
>>people who claim that TT is all we should count as evidence, or who
>>claim that functional organization does not matter. 
>
>Why is it then that when I suggest that functional organization 
>(or, more generally, "how it works") should count, no one on the
>anti-Searle side says they agree?  The response has been so
>universally negative that I've more or less given up on trying
>to make that point.

Well, I agree, for one.  I do believe, on the other hand, that *in the
universe we live in*, it is impossible to create a system which will pass
the TT but which is not actually intelligent.

However, it appears to me that the essence of the strong AI response to
Searle is that "functional organization" is *all* that counts; that being
made of the "right stuff" is not a requirement.

>Moreover, it should be straightforward to see that the TT is
>fataly flawed.  A significant aspect of human consciousness is
>that we condict an internal dialogue.  That is, we can think
>thoughts to ourself in linguistic form.

On the other hand, this strikes as exactly the kind of irrelevant detail
which is to be avoided.  This is something that, in fact, we do; but I see
no reason to believe that it is an essential part of being intelligent.