🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <1992Oct1.220055.20934@kurango.cit.gu.edu.au> tjdavis@kurango.cit.gu.edu.au (Tim Davis) writes:
>cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm) writes:

>>There are chess programs which manage to figure out why they are in
>>check, can learen how to avoid it in future, put up with it if
>>neceessary for some greater purpose, etc., all without needing to be
>>conscious of being in check. 

>I am somewhat confused by the second comment.  If in fact the chess
>programs have no need to be conscious of being in check then what is
>'it' that they are trying 'to figure out why they are in', what is 'it'
>they will 'put up with if necessary for some greater purpose'?  The
>game must be conscious of 'something' in order to develop these other
>tendencies.

Not so. All they need (and all they have) is an internal
representation of the fact and circumstances of being in check, in a
form which is amenable the mechanical inferencing system employed.
Indeed, in expert systems, knowledge representation plus mechanical
inferencing systems are not only capable of chains of deductive
reasoning, and making hypotheses and testing them, but of explaining
what they are doing and why they are doing it in a persuasively
rational manner. And all without any consciousness at all. It could
(as Babbage demonstrated) all even be done with clockwork.

One thing which artificial intelligence research has demonstrated
conclusively is that these kinds of reasoning do not need
consciousness. The fact that we employ consciousness in such reasoning
is not relevant. We also employ consciousness to perform long
division, but, fortunately for calculator manufacturers, consciousness
is not an essential ingredient of mechanised arithmetic.
-- 
Chris Malcolm    cam@uk.ac.ed.aifh          +44 (0)31 650 3085
Department of Artificial Intelligence,    Edinburgh University
5 Forrest Hill, Edinburgh, EH1 2QL, UK                DoD #205