🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <BILL.92Oct12170751@cortex.nsma.arizona.edu> bill@nsma.arizona.edu (Bill Skaggs) writes:
>jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
>
>   > Why is it then that when I suggest that functional organization  
>   > (or, more generally, "how it works") should count, no one on the
>   > anti-Searle side says they agree?
>
>The distinction is between "It thinks" and "It thinks like a human".
>I can't imagine anything passing the Turing Test that I wouldn't give
>credit for thinking, regardless of its functional organization.  On
>the other hand, I wouldn't say "It thinks like a human" unless it had
>the same functional organization as a human, even if it were
>behaviorally indistinguishable.

If it doesn't think like a human, in what sense does it think?
Is it conscious, for instance?  I have no objection to the idea
that there are other ways to think, but the word "think" doesn't
necessarily say very much.  Is the sense of thinking you have in
mind merely behavioral (kind of like "intelligent" in "intelligent
terminal")?  For if so it's true, but trivial, that anything
that passes the TT thinks.

-- jd