🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <Bv4C3v.GCK@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:

>Well, obviously all these beliefs and desires must be characterized
>holistically.  Nobody thinks, any more, that you can define a
>belief by a straightforward behavioural definition irrespective
>of the contents of other beliefs and desires.  Many beliefs will
>never exhibit themselves in behaviour, but it seems that there
>are always counterfactual circumstances under which they *would*.

Can these counterfactuals involve changes in beliefs and desires?
Because if not I don't see why there should always be such
counterfactuals.

>Further, it just seems logically or conceptually impossible
>that something could have the same functional organization as me,
>but lack beliefs entirely, or have substantially different
>beliefs.  In what could the relevant difference consist (apart
>from a possible lack of consciousness, but let's set that aside
>as a separate issue)?

Why should anyone agree to that?

Anyway, I would say a duplicate zombie would have no beliefs,
because belief has a conscious aspect and it's missing.

-- jd