🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <Bw2xzL.GIA@usenet.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:
>In article <1992Oct13.191235.17667@guinness.idbsu.edu> holmes@opal.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:
>For the umpteenth time, the possibility of non-physical qualia plays
>*no* (repeat: *no*) role in the argument.  As I stated a long long
>time ago, arguments from the possibility of non-physical qualia
>prove nothing, for the sorts of reasons you mention.  The argument
>I've made is from the possibility (even the coherent imaginability,
>if you like) of a zombie world -- the physics without the qualia,
>not vice versa.  If this world is even a coherent notion, then I'm done
>done, as it shows that the physics doesn't exhaust the way the world
>is -- after making the physics, God still had more work to do.

You *haven't* clearly stated this before -- at least not clearly enough for
me to understand it.  (The *original* example dealt with disembodied
consciousness.)

For what it's worth, I think the zombie world *is* an incoherent notion.
The qualia are part of the physical system by virtue of that system's
functional organization; the same functional organization will *necessarily*
produce qualia.

I submit as evidence that agreed point that the functional organization will
produce claims of qualia.  It is an irrelevancy that there are other
functional organizations which will produce claims of qualia without
actually having them.

(main() {int i; for (i=0;i<100;++i) printf("I have qualia.\n");})  :-)