🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <1992Oct14.223757.103240@Cookie.secapl.com> frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams) writes:
>In article <7707@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
>>In article <1992Oct13.193732.71311@Cookie.secapl.com> frank@Cookie.secapl.com (Frank Adams) writes:
>>>In article <7670@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
>>>Well, I agree, for one.  I do believe, on the other hand, that *in the
>>>universe we live in*, it is impossible to create a system which will pass
>>>the TT but which is not actually intelligent.
>>
>>It may surprise you, but I almost agree with this. 
>>
>>So far as any of us knows, it may turn out that all physically
>>possible entities that pass the TT have to do it with the aid
>>of intelligence, real understanding, consciousness, or whatever
>>we take the key issue to be.
>
>I think we entirely agree on this.  My quoted belief above is a scientific
>speculation (hypothesis would be too strong a term); I reasons for thinking
>it to be true, but there may be possibilities I have missed.

Ok.  It's good to reach some agreement from time to time!

>>  (Of course, it may also turn out
>>that there's no way to get a computer to pass the TT just by
>>giving it the right program.)
>
>I disagree.  My belief that functional organization is all that is required
>for intelligence/qualia/consciousness is much more firmly grounded; it is
>essentially a philosophical position.

Fair enough.  But I don't see how anyone can yet rule out the
possibility that certain low-level physical properties will turn
out to be necessary.  I don't have much confidence in the arguments
against this that I've seen (eg, from Chalmers).  Indeed, it seems
to me that these arguments are no more convincing that some of the
arguments (not the Chinese Room!) against programs (or digital systems)
of any sort being enough.

In other words, I think it's an open question, and I don't see
how anyone can (yet) close it.

Moreover, I think it has to be, at least in part, an empirical
question and not something we can decide a priori.

>>>>Moreover, it should be straightforward to see that the TT is
>>>>fatally flawed.  A significant aspect of human consciousness is
>>>>that we conduct an internal dialogue.  That is, we can think
>>>>thoughts to ourself in linguistic form.
>>>
>>>  This is something that, in fact, we do; but I see
>>>no reason to believe that it is an essential part of being intelligent.
>>
>>[...]
>>The internal dialogue, however, is an important part of our mental
>>life.  I think it matters whether something is conscious of, say,
>>reasons for doing one thing rather than another.  Some other entity
>>that made similar decisions without any reflective capability would
>>be significantly different.
>
>My response was putting a heavy emphasis on your "in linguistic form".

Ok.

>I expect that the existence of reflective capability will turn out to be an
>essential part of what constitutes intelligence.

I didn't mean initially to put much emphasis on "linguistic form", but
I'm not sure there can be any way of representing reasons to oneself
that we would recognize as such w/o us also seeing it as linguistic
(where the reasons are, roughly, of the sorts where _we_ use language).
I think this in part because of some things Davidson says about a
different issue in his paper "On the very idea of a conceptual scheme".

Anyway, I think we should be wary of thinking reflective = conscious.
CLOS (the Common Lisp Object System) is reflective, in a sense, as
is 3-Lisp.

>Unlike you, I strongly expect that intelligence, consciousness, and qualia
>will prove to be irretrievably intertwined, because the type of system
>needed to produce any of them will necessarily produce all of them.  (That's
>a nomic "needed" and a logical "necessarily", in case anybody's keeping
>score :-)).

I think you may be right _for certain meanings of intelligence,
consciousness, and qualia_, but I think "intelligence" is at least
headed towards having a meaning that refers only to performance
(behavior), and not necessarily at a level that would require
something like consciousness.  Indeed, I think it's already gone
far enough in that direction so that the answers for intelligence
and (human-like) consciousness can be different.

-- jeff