🚀 go-pugleaf

In <1992Oct29.180903.3088@guinness.idbsu.edu> holmes@garnet.idbsu.edu (Randall Holmes) writes:

>In article <1992Oct28.204337.11374@murdoch.acc.Virginia.EDU> crb7q@kelvin.seas.Virginia.EDU (Cameron Randale Bass) writes:
>>In article <nyikos.720043946@milo.math.scarolina.edu> nyikos@math.scarolina.edu (Peter Nyikos) writes:

>[...]
>>>
>>>That makes no difference.  My point was that quantum-magnitude
>>>perturbations *might* lead, whether by stricly causal methods or otherwise,
>>>to grossly observable changes.  The perturbations themselves, on the
>>>other hand, could at least in theory take the form of "choosing" between
>>>two or more *possible* outcomes of the same physical state of affairs.
>>>The upshot is that a non-physical soul (assuming, for the sake of argument,
>>>that such things exist) could act on a body without this action being
>>>detectable *even in theory*, yet make a big difference on how that body
>>>goes through life.

>Ridiculous.  The actions of the soul would NOT be random, so would be
>observable, so would violate QM.

As one mathematician to another, let me point out to you that "random"
has many different meanings, and the intuitive layman's idea cannot even
be given a rigorous mathematical definition.  

Which would you say is more random: a coin in which the ratio of heads
to tails by toss n  converges to 1/2 as  n  goes to infinity, or one
in which the set of limit points of the sequence is all of [0, 1] ?
Mathematicians and statisticians gravitate towards the first kind of
definition purely and simply because this choice gives rise to a never-ending
stream of new definitions, theorems, articles, books, grants, and positions,
while the latter family of concepts is not so fruitful.  

Does the quantum world really conform to the nice statistical picture that
seems to be implicit in your claim, or might it not include elements of
the second kind of randomness, to which I would give the name "wildness"?
And if the latter, do you really maintain that the action of a soul--again
assuming, for the sake of argument, that such things exist--would still
be detectable?

Peter Nyikos