🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <1992Dec16.062548.11476@u.washington.edu> joechip@hardy.u.washington.edu (Erich Vandenloos) writes:

>I've been following this thread for a bit and noticed Tarski popping up
>a couple of times. I've been reading Etchemendy's "The Concept of Logical
>Consequence," which is basically a sustained attack on Tarski's ideas
>about truth and consequence (isn't that in New Mexico?). It's interesting,
>although a little too Realist for my taste, but I was wondering if anyone
>else has read it or is reading it, and is interested in discussing it. I
>hope to hear from you hypothetical "consequence-enthusiasts" out there!

I liked this book for a number of reasons, not least for its unblinking
insistence that logical truth is just conceptual truth and vice versa.
The book doesn't really attack the received Tarskian view, though.  It's
more that it attacks what Tarski actually said, which turns out to be
somewhat different.  So somehow two wrongs turn out to be something of a
right, and the received view (logical truth/consequence = truth/consequence
in all models) isn't in too much danger.  The real work in the definition
is done by the unanalyzed modal and semantic notions ("all models" and
"true in a model" respectively), though, so no-one can claim that this
provides much of a "reduction".

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."