🚀 go-pugleaf

>From: zeleny@husc10.harvard.edu (Michael Zeleny)

>>In regular old realist semantics, the semantic value of a predicate
>>is a property. The predicate contributes that property to propositions
>>expressed by sentences in which the predicate occurs.
>
>Not so fast.  In "regular old realist semantics", the semantic value
>of a predicate is a propositional form, involving at least one
>property.  Remember the Russellian quest for the true logical form of
>language!

Is that "at least one property" the property which the predicate
expresses?

>>  "To call something rational is to express one's acceptance of norms
>>  that permit it." .... Normative talk is part of nature, but it does
>>  not describe nature. In particular, a person who calls something
>>  rational or irrational is not describing his state of mind; he is
>>  expressing it. To call something rational is not to attribute
>>  some particular property to that thing--not even the property of
>>  being permitted by accepted norms. The analysis is not directly
>>  of what it is for something to *be* rational, but of what it is
>>  for someone to *judge* that something is rational. We explain
>>  the term by saying what state of mind it expresses. In this sense
>>  the analysis is *expressivistic*, and in too big a mouthful, I shall
>>  call it the *norm-expressivistic analysis*.
>>                              [Wise Choices, Apt Feelings pp.7-8]
>>     [The quotation marks appear in the original.]
>>
>>I hope this is clear enough for present purposes. According to
>>Gibbard, there is no property of being rational. But "is rational"
>>is meaningful in that it expresses a special kind of endorsement.

MZ:
>Well, I find the distinction between describing and expressing
>*itself* to be bereft of cognitive value.  Does this mean that Gibbard
>is doing expressivist philosophy?  Or does it mean that I simply don't
>care for his brand of vacuous verbigeration?  You be the judge.

I don't know what it means. I decline to judge.

I am disappointed that you see no distinction between describing
and expressing, though. Let me try another example.

If I say, "All Jews should be exterminated," I am expressing
a hatred for Jews. But I am not describing it. If my statement
is false, it does not follow that I have described my hatred
incorrectly.

>J:
>>Similar ideas can be found in de Finetti.
>
>That's too bad.  I had more respect for him.

So you have a choice: either abandon your respect for de Finetti,
or examine your rejection of the cognitive value of expressivism.

(You might also choose to doubt my report, but I will if
pressed provide a quotation.)

>>>The speaker's degree of belief surely is a property of the speaker.
>
>J:
>>It is. But, according to de Finetti, someone who says "The eternal
>>damnation of the heretics has probability .5" does not express
>>a proposition about his state of mind, about his degree of belief.
>>He rather expresses his degree of belief.
>
>This does not sound like communication to me.

It does to me.

>J:
>>If I utter "Ow! you son of a bitch" when Tom Nagel steps on my
>>gouty toe, I have not expressed the proposition that I am in pain,
>>but I have expressed my pain.
>
>I refer you to Frege's article on thoughts.  Your pain is inherently
>inexpressible, though propositions about it can be readily expressed.

By "I have expressed my pain," I meant that it can be inferred
from my having said it that I am in pain. A smile is an expression
of happiness. The rolling of eyes is an expression of exasperation.
But neither of these facial expressions expresses a proposition.
Neither describes anything.

>_Au fond_, it is a difference in semantic theory, that generates our
>disagreement.  Consequently, to the extent that we remain exemplars of
>our own semantic views, our difference is bound to stay unresolved.

Quite.

Jamie