🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <4568@milano.UUCP> wex@milano.UUCP writes:
>I agree that there are certain classes of thoughts I have (call them I)
>which are about what might be called "imaginary" things.  These are thoughts
>about courage or God or unicorns, etc.  These thoughts are distinct from
>others in that I recognize a priori that there is no physical manfiestation
>of the thing I am thinking of.  Therefore, it is reasonable to postulate a
>mental object which is the target of I-class thoughts.
>
>However, there is another class of thoughts (call them R) which are about
>what might be called "real" things.  These are thoughts about, for example,
>the chair I sit in, the keyboard I type at, or that `unicorn' that Ringling
>Brothers have in their circus.  These R-class thoughts are distinct in that
>I recognize a priori that there is a physical manifestation of the thing I
>am thinking of.  Even in cases where I am mistaken (the object is not what I
>thought it was or it fails to exist altogether), I still think that the
>intentionality of R-class thoughts is a real thing.

I object to equating "real" with "physical".  Yes, that's an ancient
metaphysical problem, but here where we're only concerned with the
subjects of thoughts it's more tractable.  Of course, to a confirmed
Platonist, thoughts about courage or God or unicorns ARE thoughts
about a real, existing thing which just doesn't happen to have a
physical manifestation.  But you don't have to be a Platonist to
have trouble with this: when I'm searching for a bug in a program,
or trying to figure out the distinction between Artinian and
Noetherian rings, those thoughts seem very similar to my thoughts on
trying to fit a couch through the front door.  As Laura said, "My
thoughts are my thoughts."
Would someone be so kind as to post the original definition of
"intentionality", by Brandon or whatever the name was?