🚀 go-pugleaf

> In article <1992Nov1.082333.44291@kuhub.cc.ukans.edu> miner@kuhub.cc.ukans.e
> >In article <1992Oct26.215238.102458@Cookie.secapl.com>, frank@Cookie.secapl
> >> It has since that discussion occurred to me that simultaneous interpretat
> >> on multiple levels is not strictly necessary, and may in fact be false (t
> >> is, very unusual) psychologically.  It suffices that when the truth of  
> >> statement is falsified at the accepted level of precision, there is a  
> >> fallback to a less precise interpretation; and that this fallback is  
> >> understood by both speaker and listener.  This, I hope you will agree, is
> >> fairly common.  
> >  
> >We are in *partial* agreement here.  It is assumed in pragmatics that a  
> >hearer normally takes an utterance to be meaningful and tries  
> >various strategies in order to find an interpretation.  However, in  
> >contrast to your formulation, I would claim along with other  
> >pragmaticists that the *speaker* knows what level of precision he  
> >intends to convey at the time of utterance;  
>   
> We are in complete agreement to this point.  
>   
> > when you say "this  
> >fallback is understood by both speaker and hearer" I feel you are  
> >describing something special that happens or is supposed to happen  
> >in scientific discourse, specifically, when a scientific hypothesis is  
> >stated.  
>   
> I am talking about a different phenomenon.  What I am saying is that,  
> assuming that the speaker and hearer have reached the same interpretation of
> the original statement, when that interpretation is later falsified, they do
  
in other words they have acknowledge that they understood each other..  
  
> not thereafter always discard the statement entirely.  Instead, they change 
> the level of precision at which the statement is interpreted.  Neither need 
  
would they still talk about 'interpretation' ?  
  
> have considered this alternative interpretation at the time the statement  
> was made, but they will fall back to approximately the same interpretation. 
>   
> I think this occurs with at least two kinds of statements: hyphotheses and  
> observations.  Not only scientific hypotheses have this kind of property; th
  
you mean reports of observation according to the frame-work of the theory..  
  
> hypotheses of a detective investigating a crime will behave the same way.  
>   
> For observations, the fall back occurs because observations are known to be 
> imprecise.  A person can easily think he saw something slightly different  
                                        ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^  
> from what he actually saw.  A small discrepancy is generally assumed to be  
  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^  
  
intelligence rejects such a sentence:  
> he saw something slightly different from what he actually saw.   
     ^^^                                                    ^^^  
it should read:  
He saw something slightly different from what he expected to see, according  
to the theory...  
  
Because;  
"observing" is  
Roughly this: putting oneself into the most favourable situation to   
receive certain impressions with the purpose, for instance,   
of describing them. [LWPP 7e]  
  
Of course in the practice of scientific observations, the description  
should be done according to the theory....to be understood by other  
scientists who are familiar with the theory.  
  
To observe is not equal to look at or to view. (LWPP ??e)  
  
One observes in order to see what one would not see if one did not  
observe. (LWPP ??e)  
  
which amounts:  
> he saw something slightly different from what he actually saw.   
to:  
> he was not observing....  
or:  
> he failed to observe...  
  
> such an error.  
  
no such error.  
   
> My earlier suggestion that people actually make statements with multiple  
> intended levels of interpretation comes, I think, from this phenomenon.  A  
> sophisticated speaker and listener with respect to these kinds of statements
> will realize that this kind of fallback will (conditionally) occur, and  
> actually be aware of both levels at the time of the utterance.  This is  
> especially common with scientific hypotheses, since any trained scientist  
> has dealt with a large number of hypotheses.  
  
I didn't have time to consider this part...