🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <3r5f72$aip@news.cais.com>, birdhaex@cais2.cais.com says...
>
>Andrew Cott (cott@ll.mit.edu) wrote:
>
>: Heck, if Hussein had an ICBM and *no* nuclear warhead to 
>: mount on it, why shouldn't he mount a chemical/biological/explosive 
>: payload on it and point it at Central Park?  He wouldn't have to announce 
>: it's existance, just "leak" it to the US foreign service.  Then, when he 
>: next moves on Kuwait, do we risk another military action--hoping for a 
>: malfunction on that rocket?  
>
>He probably would not do it for the same reasons that he did not mount 
>chemical heads on the SCUDs launched agaisnt Israel.  

We were already in theater at that time.  It didn't take an Iraqi rocket 
scientist to realize they were in deep and sinking fast.  But I'm not 
talking about actions during conflicts.  I'm talking about maintaining the 
ability to operate autonomously in matters of foreign affairs.

>What would he 
>gain by launching and ensuring Iraq's complete destruction?  

We wouldn't do it. It's that simple.  It is quite clear to the US civilian 
government and our military that complete (or even widespread) destruction 
of Iraq would only kill thousands of innocent people who don't like Hussein 
in the first place. The threat of massive retaliation does not exist.  

>The fact 
>that Hussein attacked Kuwait was not a failure of deterrence.  The costs 
>associated with such an adventure were not well laid out for him, whereas 
>he seemed to realize that chemwar against Israel would do far more than 
>just invite a couple a conventional bombing raids.

"More than..."  You're going to have to be a bit more specific, for the 
point I am making is that it is easy to inflate our national breast and 
claim: "If you transgress the unwritten law (chem/bio/nuke) we will lay your 
country to waste."  The problem is *actually doing it*.  Are you, 
personally, willing to unleash our nuclear arsenal on someone (e.g. Hussein) 
who has just dropped some ugly substance on Manhattan that kills a few 
thousand people?  Are you willing to kill thousands of innocents in that 
country?  The hard part becomes more clear when you actually step up to the 
plate.

>
>[snip]
>
>: As a terrorist weapon, an ICBM forces the US to retaliate with global 
>: force to an attack.  Now, which would we rather do: launch planes and 
>: rockets on a foreign country that has delivered deadly agents from the
>: comfort of their own home, or capture and prosecute human agents who reak
>: havoc on our own soil and deal *diplomatically* with the offending
>: nation?  Which scenario forces escallation?
>
>This is a far more interesting point.  But what you are implying is that
>we should indirectly fuel another nation's determination to attack by
>explicity saying "we won't make you pay the ultimate price."  

Having a TMD system in place does not remove our option to inflict massive 
force.  It does make it far less likely that we would have to do it in the 
wake of an attack on our home soil.  A sense of detached security makes less 
and less sense as the days pass.  The Atlantic and Pacific oceans are 
becoming nuisance parameters.

>I have no
>quarrel with using diplomacy, God knows, but because these potentially
>offending nations realize we have the means and will to respond to any
>such attack, they wisely choose not to do so.  

Not for long.  I do not want to sound doom-and-gloom here.  That's not my 
intention.  But, realistically, the bombing in OK has demonstrated it can be 
done.  (Strictly speaking, the World Trade Center demonstrated that first.) 
Once foreign organizations have the capability to inflict damage *at a 
distance*, the music stops and we're still standing.  

>Diplomacy is involved by
>making sure that your adversary knows what your interests are _before_
>trouble starts.  

Certainly, but we cannot be on military alert 24 hours a day, worldwide.  It 
is important to note that rocket technology is spreading quite quickly.  

>In addition, for my money, I would rather invest funds
>where the _likely_ threats are going to come from;

I think you're going to have to be more specific.  The devil is in the 
details.  "Make it so" only flies on TV.

> as others in this
>thread pointed out, a terrorist-like attack that is difficult to trace to
>a specific nation is more likely the way to get at the U.S. 

In the current climate, I agree with that 100%.  My point is that the 
capability to inflict serious damage at will is increasing daily, and I 
fully expect to be alive when "terrorist" (for lack of a better term) 
countries have it. 

An operational TMD system is still some years down the road; we can't put 
off the development work until the rockets are aimed.

>: If we, as a nation, are going to be active in international conflicts, we 
>: should *not* rely on sticking our nuclear forces in the face of anyone 
>: who disagrees with our position and has rockets that can reach the US. 
>: Not only is that a world noone could possibly *want* to live in, it's no
>: way a country *should* behave, full stop.  
>
>I don't think anyone on either side of this issue is suggesting we 
>brandish our nukes about like so many cutlasses.  The fact is, nukes 
>exist and I don't think there is any way to put that genie back in the 
>bottle.  

Yep, that's for sure.  But is it responsible for us to rely on that genie as 
our only means of defending against terrorist attacks from the air?  That is 
what TMD hopes to deal with.  TMD does not have a prayer of putting that 
genie back in the bottle (though some argue that an SDI system could not 
possibly stop a massive attack completely, yet then cry out about 
destabilization; figure that one out...).

>Nonetheless, deterrence, which is not all that *hard* IMHO, 
>should work well against national actors that value their survival.

I haven't even gotten to the issues of martyrdom in other terrorist 
organizations with no capitol to bomb back to the stoneage.  

>: Finally (this *was* going to be a quick reply), the proclamations Reagan 
>: was making about an impenetrable shield was newsreeling.  At that time, 
>: however, the fish he was frying was the USSR.  Different world now, and
>: it appears it's the anti-missile-defense people that are missing the
>: boat.  
>
>Wasn't it a line of crayon (remembering the old commercials;))  there may 
>be an argument for ATBMs for the battlefield, i.e. a Patriot that is 
>designed for the task.  However, from a strategic standpoint, BMD is 
>money spent for an extrmely unlikely event.  Better to spend on the real 
>threats . . .

I guess we disagree on what is likely.  I suggest putting yourself in 
Hussein's shoes and consider what drives his (and others of his ilk) agenda. 
If all we do in issues of foreign affairs is assume our adversary will 
behave as we would, we may as well negotiate in front of the bathroom 
mirror.  

Sorry for the length of these posts, but it's a very interesting issue and a 
surprisingly civil discussion for usenet! :-)

-- 
Andrew Cott              MIT Lincoln Laboratory              cott@ll.mit.edu