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Article #77Re: Ballistic Missile Defense Act of 1995 - text
From: PAUL D. CHAPIN
Date: Thu, 08 Jun 1995 00:00
Date: Thu, 08 Jun 1995 00:00
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Andrew Cott (cott@ll.mit.edu) wrote: : In article <3r5f72$aip@news.cais.com>, birdhaex@cais2.cais.com says... : >Andrew Cott (cott@ll.mit.edu) wrote: : >: Heck, if Hussein had an ICBM and *no* nuclear warhead to : >: mount on it, why shouldn't he mount a chemical/biological/explosive : >: payload on it and point it at Central Park? There are a lot of easier ways to mount this kind of attack. And they have the advantage of obsuring the attacker which significantly reduces the change of retailation. : We wouldn't do it. It's that simple. I think we would. If I were President, I sure would. You have to establish the idea that if you mess with the US, you're going to get worked over real bad. As for the innocent civilians, it's too bad. But taking care of Iraqis in the job the Iraqi government, not ours. As a matter of policy, you can't let other countries hold their own people hostage. The exact scale of the response would very with the size of the attack, but it would be disproportional to the damage they did. There is a lot of ground between doing nothing and turning a country into a glass parking lot. : Not for long. I do not want to sound doom-and-gloom here. That's not my : intention. But, realistically, the bombing in OK has demonstrated it can be : done. (Strictly speaking, the World Trade Center demonstrated that first.) : Once foreign organizations have the capability to inflict damage *at a : distance*, the music stops and we're still standing. I don't see your point. OK was domestic. And the WTC was never linked to a specific country well enough to launch a reprisal - the reason why that type of attack is much more likely than an ICBM. The moral problem with wasting a lot of civilians go up when you have trouble proving that their even from the right country. : >Diplomacy is involved by : >making sure that your adversary knows what your interests are _before_ : >trouble starts. And requires the ability to back it up with force. "Diplomacy is saying "Good Doggie" while looking for a rock". Sorry, I can't remember the source. I think it attributed to Tallyrand. : Certainly, but we cannot be on military alert 24 hours a day, worldwide. It : is important to note that rocket technology is spreading quite quickly. Where were you during the cold war :-) I can't imagine that back tracking an incoming missile is that difficult a problem. : In the current climate, I agree with that 100%. My point is that the : capability to inflict serious damage at will is increasing daily, and I : fully expect to be alive when "terrorist" (for lack of a better term) : countries have it. They have it now. You don't see it because it's hard to use without leaving fingerprints and deterrence works most of the time. : An operational TMD system is still some years down the road; we can't put : off the development work until the rockets are aimed. : TMD does not have a prayer of putting that : genie back in the bottle (though some argue that an SDI system could not : possibly stop a massive attack completely, yet then cry out about : destabilization; figure that one out...). I am opposing a nation with SDI. I have enough missiles to get through the defense if I fire first. If he fires first, however, my surviving force will be too small - you beat SDI with numbers as much as anything. Therefore, I can not afford to let you fire first, ergo, I am motivated to launch. If he didn't have SDI, my surviving force would be sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage. I have confidence in my deterrent and have no motivation to launch. : Sorry for the length of these posts, but it's a very interesting issue and a : surprisingly civil discussion for usenet! :-) Wouldn't happen again. ;-) -- Paul Chapin A) VAX Systems Manager B) User Services Coordinator C) Information Coordinator D) All of the above Amherst College
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X-Google-Language: ENGLISH,ASCII-7-bit X-Google-Thread: 10e6d0,774d0afa1f0ce711 X-Google-Attributes: gid10e6d0,public X-Google-Thread: f9c4e,9bd65fe53b54625c X-Google-Attributes: gidf9c4e,public X-Google-Thread: 114941,9bd65fe53b54625c X-Google-Attributes: gid114941,public From: pdchapin@unix.amherst.edu (PAUL D. CHAPIN) Subject: Re: Ballistic Missile Defense Act of 1995 - text Date: 1995/06/08 Message-ID: <3r7ka6$kqp@amhux3.amherst.edu> X-Deja-AN: 104066819 distribution: inet references: <D9rKA5.JM7@midway.uchicago.edu> <3r27pf$hto@hammer.msfc.nasa.gov> <3r48ud$i01@clarknet.clark.net> <3r4eg1$p4n@ixnews5.ix.netcom.com> <3r4iap$o5j@news.cais.com> <3r4l5e$95d@news1.cle.ab.com> <3r519u$kpt@llnews.ll.mit.edu> <3r5f72$aip@news.cais.com> <3r7hfr$bfv@llnews.ll.mit.edu> followup-to: sci.space.policy,alt.war,bit.listserv.disarm-l organization: Amherst College, Amherst MA, USA newsgroups: sci.space.policy,alt.war,bit.listserv.disarm-l