🚀 go-pugleaf

Andrew Cott (cott@ll.mit.edu) wrote:
: In article <3r5f72$aip@news.cais.com>, birdhaex@cais2.cais.com says...
: >
: >He probably would not do it for the same reasons that he did not mount 
: >chemical heads on the SCUDs launched agaisnt Israel.  

: We were already in theater at that time.  It didn't take an Iraqi rocket 
: scientist to realize they were in deep and sinking fast.  But I'm not 
: talking about actions during conflicts.  I'm talking about maintaining the 
: ability to operate autonomously in matters of foreign affairs.

The fact that they were "in deep and sinking fast" would have provided an 
even greater incentive to go all out, don't you think?  And yet, Saddam 
did not, because the threat to Iraq was going to be, after all was said 
and done, fairly minimal.  But let's address the issue of broader foreign 
affairs.

: >What would he 
: >gain by launching and ensuring Iraq's complete destruction?  

: We wouldn't do it. It's that simple.  It is quite clear to the US civilian 
: government and our military that complete (or even widespread) destruction 
: of Iraq would only kill thousands of innocent people who don't like Hussein 
: in the first place. The threat of massive retaliation does not exist.  

Why do you think we would not retaliate?  You may be confusing general
concepts of morality with strategic thought, two very different animals. 
The pressure to respond would be enormous, not only because of public
opinion, but because of the signal that a non-response would send.  Far
from securing "the peace," the lack of a response would clearly send a
message that the potential costs to other aggressors seeking to do the
United States similar harm might not be that great.  The threat of 
massive retailiation does indeed exist; what you are questioning is the 
credibility of that threat.  In my opinion, that is extremely dangerous.

: >The fact 
: >that Hussein attacked Kuwait was not a failure of deterrence.  The costs 
: >associated with such an adventure were not well laid out for him, whereas 
: >he seemed to realize that chemwar against Israel would do far more than 
: >just invite a couple a conventional bombing raids.

: "More than..."  You're going to have to be a bit more specific, for the 
: point I am making is that it is easy to inflate our national breast and 
: claim: "If you transgress the unwritten law (chem/bio/nuke) we will lay your 
: country to waste."  The problem is *actually doing it*.  Are you, 
: personally, willing to unleash our nuclear arsenal on someone (e.g. Hussein) 
: who has just dropped some ugly substance on Manhattan that kills a few 
: thousand people?  Are you willing to kill thousands of innocents in that 
: country?  The hard part becomes more clear when you actually step up to the 
: plate.

What would your reaction be?  By telling Saddam that we'll be angry, but 
not inflict intolerable costs on any such adventurism, one might argue 
you increase the likelihood of the very occurence you seek to avoid.  
Personally, I don't want to kill anyone, but I recognize the nature of 
the international system.  Therefore, I would rather make it clear to 
Saddam that using WMD in New York are not in _his_ interests.  The best 
way to do that is to ensure that he understands that the costs of such 
actions would far outweigh any benefit.

: >: As a terrorist weapon, an ICBM forces the US to retaliate with global 
: >: force to an attack.  Now, which would we rather do: launch planes and 
: >: rockets on a foreign country that has delivered deadly agents from the
: >: comfort of their own home, or capture and prosecute human agents who reak
: >: havoc on our own soil and deal *diplomatically* with the offending
: >: nation?  Which scenario forces escallation?
: >
: >This is a far more interesting point.  But what you are implying is that
: >we should indirectly fuel another nation's determination to attack by
: >explicity saying "we won't make you pay the ultimate price."  

: Having a TMD system in place does not remove our option to inflict massive 
: force.  It does make it far less likely that we would have to do it in the 
: wake of an attack on our home soil.  A sense of detached security makes less 
: and less sense as the days pass.  The Atlantic and Pacific oceans are 
: becoming nuisance parameters.

But my point is having a TMD is unnecessary if your adversary understands 
that launching will be counterproductive to his interests.

: >I have no
: >quarrel with using diplomacy, God knows, but because these potentially
: >offending nations realize we have the means and will to respond to any
: >such attack, they wisely choose not to do so.  

: Not for long.  I do not want to sound doom-and-gloom here.  That's not my 
: intention.  But, realistically, the bombing in OK has demonstrated it can be 
: done.  (Strictly speaking, the World Trade Center demonstrated that first.) 
: Once foreign organizations have the capability to inflict damage *at a 
: distance*, the music stops and we're still standing.  

Exactly spot on.  And TMD does not protect us from OKC-type attacks.  In 
fact, this is how I expect an Iraq/Iran/Portugal to attack us: using such 
means that are are difficult to trace to a country of origin.  For that 
reason, I'd rather put the money for TMD into resources aimed at that 
problem.

: >Diplomacy is involved by
: >making sure that your adversary knows what your interests are _before_
: >trouble starts.  

: Certainly, but we cannot be on military alert 24 hours a day, worldwide.  It 
: is important to note that rocket technology is spreading quite quickly.  

I don't think that is necessary to communicate one's vital interests.

: >In addition, for my money, I would rather invest funds
: >where the _likely_ threats are going to come from;

: I think you're going to have to be more specific.  The devil is in the 
: details.  "Make it so" only flies on TV.

See above, following your OKC example.

: > as others in this
: >thread pointed out, a terrorist-like attack that is difficult to trace to
: >a specific nation is more likely the way to get at the U.S. 

: In the current climate, I agree with that 100%.  My point is that the 
: capability to inflict serious damage at will is increasing daily, and I 
: fully expect to be alive when "terrorist" (for lack of a better term) 
: countries have it. 

I don't think there is disagreement here, but it points away from threats 
that TMD can handle. That is the issue here, I think.

: An operational TMD system is still some years down the road; we can't put 
: off the development work until the rockets are aimed.

: >: If we, as a nation, are going to be active in international conflicts, we 
: >: should *not* rely on sticking our nuclear forces in the face of anyone 
: >: who disagrees with our position and has rockets that can reach the US. 
: >: Not only is that a world noone could possibly *want* to live in, it's no
: >: way a country *should* behave, full stop.  
: >
: >I don't think anyone on either side of this issue is suggesting we 
: >brandish our nukes about like so many cutlasses.  The fact is, nukes 
: >exist and I don't think there is any way to put that genie back in the 
: >bottle.  

: Yep, that's for sure.  But is it responsible for us to rely on that genie as 
: our only means of defending against terrorist attacks from the air?  That is 
: what TMD hopes to deal with.  TMD does not have a prayer of putting that 
: genie back in the bottle (though some argue that an SDI system could not 
: possibly stop a massive attack completely, yet then cry out about 
: destabilization; figure that one out...).

Not to get into another topic, but as the number of nukes goes down SDI 
becomes more destabilizing, because the incentive to "cheat" is increased 
in arms control agreements.  I can point you to a good article on this 
issue, if you like.

: >Nonetheless, deterrence, which is not all that *hard* IMHO, 
: >should work well against national actors that value their survival.

: I haven't even gotten to the issues of martyrdom in other terrorist 
: organizations with no capitol to bomb back to the stoneage.  

Exactly right again.  And what do you think these folks will use, a 
ballistic missile or a car bomb?

: >: Finally (this *was* going to be a quick reply), the proclamations Reagan 
: >: was making about an impenetrable shield was newsreeling.  At that time, 
: >: however, the fish he was frying was the USSR.  Different world now, and
: >: it appears it's the anti-missile-defense people that are missing the
: >: boat.  
: >
: >Wasn't it a line of crayon (remembering the old commercials;))  there may 
: >be an argument for ATBMs for the battlefield, i.e. a Patriot that is 
: >designed for the task.  However, from a strategic standpoint, BMD is 
: >money spent for an extrmely unlikely event.  Better to spend on the real 
: >threats . . .

: I guess we disagree on what is likely.  I suggest putting yourself in 
: Hussein's shoes and consider what drives his (and others of his ilk) agenda. 
: If all we do in issues of foreign affairs is assume our adversary will 
: behave as we would, we may as well negotiate in front of the bathroom 
: mirror.  

Precisely why I don't think he'd do it.  If I'm Saddam, I want to 1) live 
and 2) retain copntrol of my country.  How does nuking the US help me 
achieve these goals?

: Sorry for the length of these posts, but it's a very interesting issue and a 
: surprisingly civil discussion for usenet! :-)
               ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Don't get me started!!  That's a real pet peeve of mine.  The first group 
that I started posting in erupted into a ridiculous flame war (a war of one, 
as everyone soon ignored the fellow's rants, even those who agreed with 
him).  Actual discussion is far more interesting.

Or perhaps my "jerk" has deterred your "butthead"??! ;)

regards,
--
David Birdsey | "Don't rejoice in Victory. For while you've killed the
              |  Beast, the bitch that bore him is in heat again." 
                                                      -Bertholt Brecht
http://turnpike.net/metro/birdhaex/index.html