🚀 go-pugleaf

-From: henry@zoo.toronto.edu (Henry Spencer)
-Subject: Re: Fabrication (was fast track failures)
-Date: 5 Jan 93 00:39:01 GMT
-Organization: U of Toronto Zoology

-Moreover, there is a deeper issue here.  Yes, having the engineers out
-of tune with metal-bending is a bad thing when the objective is to
-manufacture something.  It's worse, though, when they're trying to
-*develop* something.

-Gary's comments (the >>> above) are squarely in the NASA mold:  if you
-do it right on paper, it will work the first time (although of course
-you test it just in case).  Unfortunately, the real world doesn't work
-that way, as witness any number of NASA projects that *didn't* work
-the first time.  Real-world development involves *finding out* what
-works and what doesn't... and you cannot do that on paper.  You have
-to test things *during* the engineering, not just afterward.

Relevant to the discussion, I thought at least the major components of
the Shuttle were tested to some extent before STS-1. Perhaps not as much
as they could have been, but I remember all the SRB ground tests, all the
burned/exploded SSMEs, the glide tests of Enterprise, etc. 

It probably wasn't practical to test some of the components (i.e. the ET)
except in actual flight. I suppose the thermal tiles could have been tested
on an unmanned capsule before the first flight of the Shuttle.

There is perhaps still some debate on whether STS-1 should have been unmanned.
I'd say that from an economic viewpoint, if the presence of humans could
significantly improve it's chances of safe return, then it was worthwhile to
have it manned. The Soviets didn't have that option with Buran - for
political reasons, it had to launch sometime around the first post-Challenger
Shuttle launch, and it didn't have life support (or onboard power other than
batteries).

John Roberts
roberts@cmr.ncsl.nist.gov